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Abstract
The design of profit-maximizing multi-item mechanisms is a notoriously challenging problem
with tremendous real-world impact. The mechanism designer’s goal is to field a mechanism
with high expected profit on the distribution over buyers’ values. Unfortunately, if the set of
mechanisms he optimizes over is complex, a mechanism may have high empirical profit over a
small set of samples but low expected profit. This raises the question, how many samples are
sufficient to ensure that the empirically optimal mechanism is nearly optimal in expectation?
We uncover structure shared by a myriad of pricing, auction, and lottery mechanisms that allows
us to prove strong sample complexity bounds: for any set of buyers’ values, profit is a piecewise
linear function of the mechanism’s parameters. We prove new bounds for mechanism classes
not yet studied in the sample-based mechanism design literature and match or improve over
the best known guarantees for many classes. The profit functions we study are significantly
different from well-understood functions in machine learning, so our analysis requires a sharp
understanding of the interplay between mechanism parameters and buyer values. We strengthen
our main results with data-dependent bounds when the distribution over buyers’ values is “well-
behaved.” Finally, we investigate a fundamental tradeoff in sample-based mechanism design:
complex mechanisms often have higher profit than simple mechanisms, but more samples are
required to ensure that empirical and expected profit are close. We provide techniques for
optimizing this tradeoff.
1 Introduction
One of the most tantalizing and long-standing open problems in mechanism design is profit maxi-
mization in multi-item, multi-buyer settings. Much of the literature surrounding this problem rests
on the strong assumption that the mechanism designer knows the distribution over buyers’ values.
In reality, this information is rarely available. The support of the distribution alone is often doubly
exponential, so obtaining and storing the distribution is impractical.
We relax this assumption and instead assume that the mechanism designer only has a set of
samples from the distribution (Likhodedov and Sandholm, 2004, 2005; Sandholm and Likhode-
dov, 2015). In this work, we develop learning-theoretic foundations of sample-based mechanism
design. In particular, we provide generalization guarantees which bound the difference between
the empirical profit of a mechanism over a set of samples and its expected profit on the unknown
distribution.
A substantial body of theory on sample-based mechanism design has developed recently, pri-
marily in single-parameter settings (Alon et al., 2017; Elkind, 2007; Cole and Roughgarden, 2014;
Huang et al., 2015; Medina and Mohri, 2014; Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2015; Roughgarden
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and Schrijvers, 2016; Devanur et al., 2016; Gonczarowski and Nisan, 2017; Hartline and Taggart,
2016; Bubeck et al., 2017; Chawla et al., 2014). In this paper, we present a general theory for deriv-
ing worst-case generalization guarantees in multi-item settings, as well as data-dependent guaran-
tees when the distribution over buyers’ values is well-behaved. We analyze mechanism classes that
have not yet been studied in the sample-based mechanism design literature and match or improve
over the best-known guarantees for many of the special classes that have been studied.
1.1 Our contributions
Our contributions come in three interrelated parts.
A general theory of worst-case generalization guarantees for profit maximization. We
uncover a key structural property shared by a variety of mechanisms which allows us to prove
strong generalization guarantees: for any fixed set of bids, profit is a piecewise linear function of
the mechanism’s parameters. Our main theorem provides generalization guarantees for any class
exhibiting this structure. To prove this theorem, we relate the complexity of the partition split-
ting the parameter space into linear portions to the intrinsic complexity of the mechanism class,
which we quantify using pseudo-dimension. In turn, pseudo-dimension bounds imply generalization
bounds. We prove that many mechanisms throughout economics, artificial intelligence, and theo-
retical computer science share this structure, and thus our main theorem yields strong learnability
guarantees.
We prove that our main theorem applies to randomized mechanisms, making us the first to
provide generalization bounds for these mechanisms. Our guarantees apply to lotteries, a general
representation of randomized mechanisms, which are extremely important in the intersection of
economics and computation (e.g., (Babaioff et al., 2017; Briest et al., 2010; Chawla et al., 2010)).
Randomized mechanisms are known to generate higher expected revenue than deterministic mech-
anisms in many settings (e.g., Conitzer and Sandholm (2003); Dobzinski and Dughmi (2009)). Our
results imply, for example, that if the mechanism designer plans to offer a menu of ` lotteries over
m items to an additive or unit-demand buyer, then O˜
(
U2`m/2
)
samples are sufficient to ensure
that every menu’s expected profit is -close to its empirical profit, where U is the maximum profit
achievable over the support of the buyer’s valuation distribution.
We also provide guarantees for pricing mechanisms using our main theorem. These include
item-pricing mechanisms, also known as posted-price mechanisms, where each item has a price
and buyers buy their utility-maximizing bundles. These mechanisms are prevalent throughout
economics and computation (e.g., (Feldman et al., 2015; Babaioff et al., 2014; Cai et al., 2016)).
Additionally, we study multi-part tariffs, where there is an upfront fee and a price per unit. We are
the first to provide generalization bounds for these tariffs and other non-linear pricing mechanisms,
which have been studied in economics for decades (e.g., (Oi, 1971; Feldstein, 1972; Wilson, 1993)).
For instance, our main theorem guarantees that if there are κ units of a single good for sale, then
O˜
(
U2κ/2
)
samples are sufficient to learn a nearly optimal two-part tariff. See Figure 1 for an
illustration of the partition of the two-part tariff parameter space into piecewise-linear portions.
Our main theorem implies generalization bounds for many auction classes, such as second price
auctions, which are fundamentally important in economics and beyond (e.g., (Vickrey, 1961; Cesa-
Bianchi et al., 2015; Daskalakis and Syrgkanis, 2016)). We also study generalized VCG auctions,
such as affine maximizer auctions, virtual valuations combinatorial auctions, and mixed-bundling
auctions, which have been studied in AI and economics (e.g., (Sandholm and Likhodedov, 2015;
Roberts, 1979; Lavi et al., 2003; Dobzinski and Sundararajan, 2008; Jehiel et al., 2007)).
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Figure 1: This figure illustrates a partition of the two-part tariff parameter space into piecewise-
linear portions. Under a two-part tariff there are multiple units of a single good for sale. The seller
sets an entry fee p1 and a price p2 per unit. If a buyer wishes to buy t ≥ 1 units, she pays p1 +p2 · t
and otherwise she pays nothing. See Example 2.1 for more details.
Next, we combine our analysis with tools from the structured prediction literature in theoret-
ical machine learning. In doing so, we provide more refined upper bounds for several “simple”
mechanism classes and answer an open question posed by Morgenstern and Roughgarden (2016).
A key challenge which differentiates our generalization guarantees from those typically found in
machine learning is the sensitivity of these mechanisms to small changes in their parameters. For
example, changing the price of a good can cause a steep drop in profit if the buyer no longer wants to
buy it. Meanwhile, for many well-understood function classes in machine learning, there is a close
connection between the distance in parameter space between two parameter vectors and the distance
in function space between the two corresponding functions. Understanding this connection is often
the key to quantifying the class’s intrinsic complexity. Intrinsic complexity typically translates to
pseudo-dimension or another metric which allows us to derive learnability guarantees. Since profit
functions do not exhibit this predictable behavior, we must carefully analyze the structure of the
mechanisms we study in order to derive strong generalization guarantees.
Data-dependent generalization guarantees for profit maximization. We provide several
data-dependent tools that strengthen our main theorem when the distribution over buyers’ values
is “well-behaved.” First, we prove generalization guarantees that, surprisingly, are independent
of the number of items for item-pricing mechanisms, second price auctions with reserves, and a
subset of lottery mechanisms. Under anonymous prices, our bounds do not depend on the number
of bidders either. These guarantees hold when the bidders are additive with values drawn from
item-independent distributions (bidder i1’s value for item j is independent from her value for item
j′, but her value for item j may be arbitrarily correlated with bidder i2’s value for item j).
Bidders with item-independent value distributions have been studied extensively in prior re-
search (e.g., (Cai and Daskalakis, 2017; Yao, 2014; Cai et al., 2016; Goldner and Karlin, 2016;
Babaioff et al., 2017; Chawla et al., 2007; Hart and Nisan, 2012)). Cai and Daskalakis (2017)
provide learning algorithms for bidders with valuations drawn from product distributions, which
are item-independent. Their algorithms return mechanisms whose expected revenue is a constant
fraction of the optimal revenue obtainable by any randomized and Bayesian truthful mechanism.
Relying on prior work (Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2016; Goldner and Karlin, 2016), their
sample complexity guarantee when the buyers are additive is O
(
(U/)2(nm log(nm) + log(1/δ))
)
,
where n is the number of buyers. We improve this to O
(
(U/)2(n log n+ log(1/δ))
)
, completely
removing the dependence on the number of items.
We also provide data-dependent generalization guarantees that, at a high level, are robust to
outliers. Worst-case generalization guarantees typically grow linearly with the maximum profit
achievable over the support of the distribution. They are thus pessimistic when the highest valua-
tions have a low probability mass. We show how to obtain stronger guarantees in this setting.
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See Table 1 for a subset of our bounds and Table 2 in Appendix A for all bounds. For ease
of comparison, we represent them using Rademacher complexity, a tool we use to prove our data-
dependent bounds. Classic results in learning theory guarantee that with high probability over
a set of samples S, for any mechanism in a class M, the difference between its expected and
empirical profit is O˜
(
R̂S(M) + U
√
1/|S|
)
, where R̂S(M) is the Rademacher complexity of M
over S. Typically, O˜
(
R̂S(M) + U
√
1/|S|
)
goes to zero as |S| grows. Bounding this quantity by
, we can solve for the number of samples sufficient to ensure that empirical and expected profit
are -close.
Structural profit maximization. Many of the mechanism classes we study exhibit a hierar-
chical structure. For example, when designing a pricing mechanism, the designer can segment
the population into k groups and charge each group a different price. This is prevalent throughout
daily life: movie theaters and amusement parks have different admission prices per market segment,
with groups such as Child, Student, Adult, and Senior Citizen. In the simplest case, k = 1 and
the prices are anonymous. If k equals the number of buyers, the prices are non-anonymous, thus
forming a hierarchy of mechanisms. In general, the designer should not choose the simplest class
to optimize over simply to guarantee good generalization because more complex classes are more
likely to contain nearly optimal mechanisms. We show how the mechanism designer can determine
the precise level in the hierarchy assuring him the optimal tradeoff between profit maximization
and generalization.
1.2 Related research
Sample-based mechanism design was introduced in the context of automated mechanism design
(AMD). In AMD, the goal is to design algorithms that take as input information about a set of
buyers and return a mechanism that maximizes an objective such as revenue (Conitzer and Sand-
holm, 2002; Sandholm, 2003; Conitzer and Sandholm, 2004). The input information about the
buyers in early AMD was an explicit description of the distribution over their valuations. The sup-
port of the distribution’s prior is often doubly exponential, for example in combinatorial auctions,
so obtaining and storing the distribution is impractical. In response, sample-based mechanism
design was introduced where the input is a set of samples from this distribution (Likhodedov and
Sandholm, 2004, 2005; Sandholm and Likhodedov, 2015). Those papers also introduced the idea
of searching for a high-revenue mechanism in a parameterized space where any parameter vector
yields a mechanism that satisfies the individual rationality and incentive-compatibility constraints.
This was in contrast to the traditional, less scalable approach of representing mechanism design as
an unrestricted optimization problem where those constraints need to be explicitly modeled. The
parameterized work studied algorithms for designing combinatorial auctions with high empirical
revenue. We follow the parameterized approach, but we study generalization guarantees, which
they did not address.
Prior work on the sample complexity of profit maximization has primarily concentrated on the
single-item setting, with the exception of work by Morgenstern and Roughgarden (2016); Balcan
et al. (2016); Syrgkanis (2017); Medina and Vassilvitskii (2017), and Cai and Daskalakis (2017). We
provide a detailed comparison of our results to these papers on multi-item mechanisms in Section 6.
Earlier work of Balcan et al. (2008) addressed sample complexity for revenue maximization in
unrestricted supply settings. From an algorithmic perspective, Devanur et al. (2016); Hartline and
Taggart (2016), and Gonczarowski and Nisan (2017) provide computationally efficient algorithms
for learning nearly-optimal single-item auctions in various settings.
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Valuations Auction class Our bounds Prior bounds
Additive or
unit-
demand
Length-` lottery menu U
√
`m log(`m)/N N/A
Additive,
item-
independent∗
Length-` item lottery menu U
√
` log `/N N/A
(a) Rademacher complexity bounds in big-O for lotteries.
Valuations Mechanism class Price class Our bounds Prior bounds
General Length-` menus of
two-part tariffs
over κ units
Anonymous U
√
` log(κn`)/N N/A
Non-anonymous U
√
n` log(κn`)/N N/A
Non-linear pricing Anonymous U
√
m
∏m
i=1 (κi + 1) /N
†‡ N/A
Non-anonymous U
√
nm
∏m
i=1 (κi + 1) /N
†‡ N/A
Additively
decomposable
non-linear pricing
Anonymous U
√
m
∑m
i=1 κi/N
†‡ N/A
Non-anonymous U
√
nm
∑m
i=1 κi/N
†‡ N/A
Unit-
demand
Item-pricing Anonymous U
√
m ·min{m, log(nm)}/N U√m2/N§
Non-anonymous U
√
nm log(nm)/N U
√
nm2 logn/N§
Additive,
item-
independent∗
Item-pricing Anonymous U
√
1/N U
√
m logm/N§
Non-anonymous U
√
n logn/N U
√
nm log(nm)/N§
(b) Rademacher complexity bounds in big-O for pricing mechanisms.
Valuations Auction class Our bounds Prior bounds
General AMAs and λ-auctions U
√
nm+1m logn/N cU
√
m/Nnm+2
(
n2 +
√
nm
)†¶‖
VVCAs U
√
n2m2m logn/N cU
√
m/Nnm+2
(
n2 +
√
nm
)†¶‖
MBARPs U
√
m(logn+m)/N U
√
m3 logn/N¶
Additive,
item-
independent∗
Second price item auctions with
anonymous reserve prices
U
√
1/N U
√
m logm/N§
Second price item auctions with
non-anonymous reserve prices
U
√
n logn/N U
√
nm log(nm)/N§
(c) Rademacher complexity bounds in big-O for auction classes.
∗ Additive cost function; † Ignoring log factors; ‖ The value of c > 1 depends on the range of the auction parameters;
§ Morgenstern and Roughgarden (2016); ¶ Balcan et al. (2016); ‡ κi is an upper bound on the number of units available
of item i.
Table 1: A subset of our Rademacher complexity bounds. We denote the maximum profit achievable
by any mechanism in the class over the support of the bidders’ valuation distribution by U . There
are m items and n buyers. The cost function is general unless otherwise noted.
5
Several papers proved sample complexity guarantees using tools from the structured prediction
literature (e.g., (Collins, 2000)), which we discuss in Section 5. Balcan et al. (2014) and Hsu et al.
(2016) used these tools in a different setting than us: Balcan et al. (2014) provided algorithms
that make use of past data describing the purchases of a utility-maximizing agent to produce a
hypothesis function that can accurately forecast the future behavior of the agent. Hsu et al. (2016)
used structured prediction to bound the pseudo-dimension of welfare maximization for item-pricing
mechanisms as well as the concentration of demand for any particular good.
Morgenstern and Roughgarden (2016) relied on structured prediction to provide sample com-
plexity guarantees for several so called “simple” mechanism classes. In several cases, they proved
loose guarantees using structured prediction; in the appendix, they used a first-principles approach
to prove stronger guarantees. They did not explicitly consider the partition of the parameter space
into regions over which profit is linear, but we can map their approach into our framework. In
essence, their proofs break the parameter space into axis-aligned rectangles over which profit is
linear. By analyzing more general partitions than axis-aligned rectangles, we match their tighter
guarantees and provide bounds for mechanism classes they did not study.
1.3 Preliminaries and notation
We consider the problem of selling m heterogeneous goods to n buyers. We denote a bundle of
goods as a quantity vector q ∈ Zm≥0. The number of units of item i in the bundle represented by q is
denoted by its ith component q[i]. Accordingly, the bundle consisting of only one copy of the ith item
is denoted by the standard basis vector ei, where ei[i] = 1 and ei[j] = 0 for all j 6= i. Each buyer j ∈
[n] has a valuation function vj over bundles of goods. If one bundle q0 is contained within another
bundle q1 (i.e., q0[i] ≤ q1[i] for all i ∈ [m]), then vj (q0) ≤ vj (q1) and vj (0) = 0. We denote an
allocation as Q = (q1, . . . , qn) where qj is the bundle of goods that buyer j receives under allocation
Q. The cost to produce the bundle q is denoted as c (q) and the cost to produce the allocation Q is
c (Q) =
∑n
i=1 c (qi). Suppose there are κi units available of item i. Let K =
∏m
i=1 κi. We use vj =
(vj (q1) , . . . , vj (qK)) to denote buyer j’s values for all of the K bundles and we use v = (v1, . . . ,vn)
to denote a vector of buyer values. We also study additive buyers (vj (q) =
∑m
i=1 q[i]vj (ei)) and
unit-demand buyers
(
vj (q) = maxi:q[i]≥1 vj (ei)
)
. Every auction in the classes we study is incentive
compatible, so we assume that the bids equal the bidders’ valuations.
There is an unknown distribution D over buyers’ values. We make very few assumptions about
this distribution. First of all, we do not assume the distribution belongs to a parametric family.
Moreover, we do not assume the buyers’ values are independently or identically distributed. In
particular, a bidder’s values for multiple bundles may be correlated, and multiple bidders may have
correlated values as well. We denote the support of D using the notation X . Therefore, X is a set
of buyers’ values.
We say that profitM (v) is the profit of a mechanism M on the valuation vector v. For a
distribution D over buyers’ values, we denote the expected profit of M over D as profitD (M) and
for a set of samples S, we denote the average profit of M over S as profitS (M).
We study real-valued functions parameterized by vectors p in Rd, denoted as fp : X → R. For
a fixed v ∈ X , we often consider fp (v) as a function of its parameters, which we denote as fv (p).
2 A general theory for worst-case generalization guarantees
We now present a general theory for deriving generalization bounds. We assume there is an unknown
distribution D over buyers’ values, with support X . For a given mechanism class M, we aim to
define a function M (N, δ) such that the following generalization guarantee holds:
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Figure 2: This figure illustrates the partition of the two-part tariff parameter space into piecewise-
linear portions in the following scenario: there is one buyer whose value for one unit is v1(1) = 6,
value for two units is v1(2) = 9, value for three units is v1(3) = 11, and value for i ≥ 4 units is
v1(i) = 12. We assume the seller produces at most four units. The buyer will buy exactly one unit
if v1(1) − p1 − p2 > v1(i) − p1 − i · p2 for all i ∈ {2, 3, 4} and v1(1) − p1 − p2 > 0. This region of
the parameter space is colored orange. By similar logic, the buyer will buy exactly two units in the
blue region, exactly three units in the green region, and exactly four units in the red region.
With probability 1−δ over the draw S ∼ DN , for anyM ∈M, |profitS (M)− profitD (M)| ≤
M (N, δ).
Our main theorem uses structure shared by a myriad of mechanism classes to characterize the
function M (N, δ), which is called a uniform convergence bound. Our results apply broadly to
parameterized sets M of mechanisms. This means that every mechanism in M is defined by a
vector p ∈ Rd, where the value of d depends on the mechanism class. For example, p ∈ Rm might
be a vector of prices. Our guarantees apply to mechanism classes where for every valuation vector
v ∈ X , profit as a function of the parameters p, denoted profitv (p), is piecewise linear. We begin
by illustrating this property via several simple examples.
Example 2.1 (Two-part tariffs). In a two-part tariff, there are multiple units of a single good for
sale. The seller sets an upfront fee p1 and a price per unit p2. Here, we consider the simple case
where there is a single buyer∗. If the buyer wishes to buy t ≥ 1 units, she pays the upfront fee
p1 plus p2 · t, and if she does not want to buy anything, she does not pay anything. Two-part
tariffs have been studied extensively by economists (Oi, 1971; Feldstein, 1972; Wilson, 1993) and
are prevalent throughout daily life. For example, gym and golf membership programs often require
an upfront membership fee plus a fee per month. In many cities, purchasing a public transportation
card requires a small upfront fee and an additional cost per ride. Many coffee machines, such as
those made by Keurig and Nespresso, require specialty coffee pods. Purchasing these pods amounts
to paying a fee per unit on top of the upfront fee, which is the cost of the coffee machine.
Suppose there are κ units of the good for sale. The buyer will buy exactly t ∈ {1, . . . , κ} units
so long as v1 (t) − (p1 + p2 · t) > v1 (t′) − (p1 + p2 · t′) for all t′ 6= t and v1 (t) − (p1 + p2 · t) > 0.
Therefore, for a fixed set of buyer values, there are
(
κ+1
2
)
hyperplanes splitting R2 into convex
regions such that within any one region, the number of units bought does not vary. So long as the
number of units bought is invariant, profit is a linear function of p1 and p2. See Figure 2 for an
illustration.
∗We generalize to multiple buyers in Section 2.1.2.
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Example 2.2 (Lotteries). A lottery is defined by a price p ∈ R and a vector φ = (φ[1], . . . , φ[m]) ∈
[0, 1]m, where φ[i] is the probability that the bidder receives item i. In this example, we consider
the simple case where there is one additive buyer, no supplier cost, and a single lottery for sale.
The buyer’s expected utility for a lottery (φ, p) is Eq∼φ[v (q)] − p. We know that the buyer will
choose to buy the lottery so long as Eq∼φ[v (q)] = v · (φ[1], . . . , φ[m]) ≥ p. If the buyer buys the
lottery, she will pay a price of p, and otherwise she will pay nothing. Therefore, there is a single
hyperplane breaking the parameter space into regions where profit is linear.
We provide generalization guarantees that are closely dependent on the “complexity” of the
partition splitting Rd into regions such that profitv (p) is linear. Inspired by structure exhibited by
many mechanism classes, such as Examples 2.1 and 2.2, we require that this partition be defined
by a finite number of hyperplanes. We give the following name to this type of mechanism class:
Definition 2.1 ((d, t)-delineable). We say a mechanism class M is (d, t)-delineable if:
1. The class M consists of mechanisms parameterized by vectors p from a set P ⊆ Rd; and
2. For any v ∈ X , there is a set H of t hyperplanes such that for any connected component P ′
of P \ H, the function profitv (p) is linear over P ′.
We relate delineability to the mechanism class’s intrinsic complexity using pseudo-dimension.
Definition 2.2 (Pseudo-dimension (Pollard, 1984)). Let S = {v(1), . . . ,v(N)} be a subset of X
and let z(1), . . . , z(N) ∈ R be a set of targets. We say that z(1), . . . , z(N) witness the shattering
of S by M if for all T ⊆ S, there exists some mechanism MT ∈ M such that for all v(i) ∈ T ,
profitMT
(
v(i)
) ≤ z(i) and for all v(i) 6∈ T , profitMT (v(i)) > z(i). If there exists some z ∈ RN
that witnesses the shattering of S by M, then we say that S is shatterable by M. Finally, the
pseudo-dimension ofM, denoted Pdim (M), is the size of the largest set that is shatterable byM.
Theorem 2.1 provides generalization bounds in terms of pseudo-dimension.
Theorem 2.1 (Pollard (1984)). For anyM, let U be the maximum profit achievable by mechanisms
in M. Then M (N, δ) = O
(
U
√
Pdim (M) /N + U√ln (1/δ) /N) .
In Theorem 2.2, we relate pseudo-dimension to delineability. The full proof is in Appendix A.
Theorem 2.2. If M is (d, t)-delineable, the pseudo dimension of M is O (d log (dt)).
Proof sketch. Suppose the pseudo-dimension of M is N . By definition, there exists a set S ={
v(1), . . . ,v(N)
}
that is shattered by M. Let z(1), . . . , z(N) ∈ R be the points that witness this
shattering. Again, by definition, we know that for any T ⊆ [N ], there exists a parameter vector
pT ∈ P such that if i ∈ T , then profitpT
(
v(i)
) ≥ z(i) and if i 6∈ T , then profitpT (v(i)) < z(i). Let
P∗ = {pT : T ⊆ [N ]}. We prove that |P∗| = 2N < dNddtd, which means that N = O (d log (dt)).
To this end, for v(i) ∈ S, let H(i) be the set of t hyperplanes such profitv(i) (p) is linear over each
connected component of P \H(i). We now consider the overlay of all N partitions P \H(1), . . . ,P \
H(N). This overlay is made up of the sets P1, . . . ,Pτ , which are the connected components of
P \
(⋃N
i=1H(i)
)
. For each set Pj and each i ∈ [N ], Pj is completely contained in a single connected
component of P \ H(i), which means that profitv(i) (p) is linear over Pj . (See Figures 3a, 3b, and
3c.)
Since profit is linear within each set Pj for j ∈ [τ ], we use the hyperplanes defined by those
linear functions to further subdivide each set Pj into regions P ′ where for all i ∈ [N ] and all p ∈ P ′,
either profitv(i) (p) < z
(i) or vice versa (but not both). (See Figure 3d.) Thus, at most one vector
p ∈ P∗ can come from P ′. Counting the number of subdivisions proves the theorem.
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(a) A partition by hy-
perplanes.
(b) Another partition
by hyperplanes.
(c) The overlay of par-
titions (a) and (b).
(d) A further subdivi-
sion of each region.
Figure 3: Illustrations of the proof of Theorem 2.2.
2.1 Delineable mechanism classes
We now show that a diverse array of mechanism classes are delineable, so we can apply Theorem 2.2.
We warm up with Examples 2.1 and 2.2. The full proofs of all theorems are in Appendix A.
Theorem 2.3. Let M be the class of two-part tariffs over a single buyer and κ units of a single
good. Then M is (2, (κ+12 ))-delineable.
Proof. The parameter space definingM is R2. As we saw in Example 2.1, for any valuation vector
v, there are
(
κ+1
2
)
hyperplanes splitting R2 into regions over which profitv (p) is linear.
Theorem 2.4. Let M be the class of lottery mechanisms over m items and one additive bidder.
Suppose that the cost to produce each item is zero. Then M is (m+ 1, 1)-delineable.
Proof. This class’s parameter space is Rm+1, since there is one price p for the lottery and one
probability φ[i] per item i. As we saw in Example 2.2, for any valuation vector v, there is a single
hyperplane splitting Rm+1 into regions such that within any one region, profitv (p) is linear.
2.1.1 Lotteries
We now apply Theorem 2.2 to lottery menus. A length-` lottery menu is a set
M =
{(
φ(0), p(0)
)
,
(
φ(1), p(1)
)
, . . . ,
(
φ(`), p(`)
)}
⊆ Rm × R,
where φ(0) = 0 and p(0) = 0. As is typical in the lottery literature, we assume there is a single
additive buyer; our results easily generalize to unit-demand buyers and multiple buyers (see Ap-
pendix A.1 for details). Under the lottery
(
φ(j), p(j)
)
, the buyer receives each item i with probability
φ(j)[i] and pays a price of p(j). Since v1(ei) · φ(j)[i] is their value for item i times the probability
they get that item, their expected utility is
∑m
i=1 v1(ei) · φ(j)[i] − p(j). Given a buyer with values
defined by v, let (φv, pv) ∈ M be the lottery that maximizes the buyer’s expected utility. We
use the notation q ∼ φv to denote a random allocation of the lottery (φv, pv). Specifically, for all
i ∈ [m], q[i] = 1 with probability φv[i] and q[i] = 0 with probability 1− φv[i]. The expected profit
is profitM (v) = pv − Eq∼φv [c (q)]]. Let M be the class of all length-` lottery menus.
The key challenge in bounding Pdim (M) is that Eq∼φv [c (q)] is not a piecewise linear function
of the parameters φ(0), . . . ,φ(`). To overcome this challenge, rather than bounding Pdim (M),
we bound the pseudo-dimension of a related class M′. We then show that optimizing over M′
amounts to optimizing over M itself. To motivate the definition of M′, notice that if z ∼
U ([0, 1]m), the probability that z[j] is smaller than φv[j] is φv[j]. Therefore, Eq∼φv [c (q)] =
Ez
[
c
(∑
j:z[j]<φv [j]
ej
)]
. For a lottery M , we define profit′M (v, z) := pv − c
(∑
j:z[j]<φv [j]
ej
)
and
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define M′ = {profit′M : M ∈M}. The important insight is that M′ is delineable because for a
fixed pair (v, z), both the lottery the buyer chooses and the bundle
∑
j:z[j]<φv [j]
ej are defined by
a set of hyperplanes.
Theorem 2.5. For additive and unit-demand buyers, M′ is
(
` (m+ 1) , (`+ 1)2 +m`
)
-delineable.
Proof sketch. The buyer will prefer lottery j ∈ {0, . . . , `} so long as v ·φ(j) > v ·φ(k) for any k 6= j,
which defines at most (`+ 1)2 hyperplanes in R`(m+1). Next, for each lottery
(
φ(k), p(k)
)
, there
are m hyperplanes determining the vector
∑
i:z[i]<φ(k)[i] ei, and thus the cost c
(∑
i:z[i]<φ(k)[i] ei
)
.
These hyperplanes have the form z[i] = φ(k)[i]. So long as the buyer’s preferred lottery
(
φ(j), p(j)
)
and the cost c
(∑
i:z[i]<φ(j)[i] ei
)
are fixed, profit is a linear function of the price.
The following theorem guarantees that optimizing overM′ amounts to optimizing overM itself.
It follows from the fact that for all v and M , profitM (v) = Ez[profit′M (v, z)].
Theorem 2.6. With probability 1− δ over the draw of a sample {(v(1), z(1)) , . . . , (v(N), z(N))} ∼
(D × U ([0, 1])m)N , for all mechanisms M ∈M, | 1N
∑N
i=1 profit
′
M
(
v(i), z(i)
)−Ev∼D[profitM (v)]| =
O
(
U
√
Pdim (M′) /N + U√log (1/δ) /N) .
2.1.2 Non-linear pricing mechanisms
Non-linear pricing mechanisms are specifically used to sell multiple units of each good. We assume
that the cost function caps the total number of units of each item that the producer will supply.
In other words, there is some cap κi per item i such that it costs more to produce κi units of item
i than the buyers will pay. Formally, this means that there exists (κ1, . . . , κm) ∈ Rm such that for
all v ∈ X and all allocations Q = (q1, . . . , qn), if there exists an item i such that
∑n
j=1 qj [i] > κi,
then
∑n
j=1 vj (qj)− c (Q) < 0.
Menus of two-part tariffs. Menus of two-part tariffs are a generalization of Example 2.1. The
seller offers the buyers ` different two-part tariffs and each buyer chooses the tariff and number
of units that maximizes his utility. If the prices are non-anonymous, then each buyer is presented
with a different menu of two-part tariffs.
Theorem 2.7. LetM andM′ be the classes of anonymous and non-anonymous length-` menus of
two-part tariffs. Then M is
(
2`, O
(
n (κ`)2
))
-delineable and M′ is
(
2n`,O
(
n (κ`)2
))
-delineable.
Proof sketch. This proof is similar to that of Theorem 2.3, except the parameter space is R`κ and
there are now at most O
(
n (κ`)2
)
relevant hyperplanes: for each buyer j, she must decide which
tariff to buy and how many units to buy. For non-anonymous prices, the argument is similar.
General non-linear pricing mechanisms. We study non-linear pricing under Wilson’s bundling
interpretation (Wilson, 1993): If the prices are anonymous, there is a price per quantity vector q
denoted p (q). Buyer j will purchase the bundle that maximizes vj (q) − p (q). If the prices are
non-anonymous, there is a price per quantity vector q and buyer j ∈ [n] denoted pj (q).
Theorem 2.8. LetM andM′ be the classes of anonymous and non-anonymous non-linear pricing
mechanisms. Let K =
∏m
i=1 (κi + 1). Then M is
(
K,nK2
)
-delineable and M′ is (nK, nK2)-
delineable.
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Proof sketch. For anonymous prices, each mechanism is defined by K parameters because there are
K bundles and a price per bundle. Next, for each bidder j ∈ [n], there are (K2 ) hyperplanes of the
form vj (q)− p (q) = vj (q′)− p (q′) determining whether the buyer prefers the bundle q or q′. The
analysis for non-anonymous prices follows similarly.
We prove polynomial bounds when prices are additive over items (Theorem A.3 in Appendix A).
2.1.3 Item-pricing mechanisms
We now describe the application of Theorem 2.2 to anonymous and non-anonymous item-pricing
mechanisms. Under anonymous prices, the seller sets a price per item. Under non-anonymous
prices, there is a buyer-specific price per item. We assume that there is some fixed but arbitrary
ordering on the buyers such that the first buyer in the ordering arrives first and buys the bundle of
goods that maximizes his utility, then the next buyer in the ordering arrives and buys the bundle
of remaining goods that maximizes his utility, and so on.
Theorem 2.9. Let M and M′ be the classes of item-pricing mechanisms with anonymous prices
and non-anonymous prices, respectively. If the buyers are additive, then M is (m,m)-delineable
and M′ is (nm, nm)-delineable.
Proof sketch. For a given valuation vector v, let ji be the buyer with the highest value for item i.
Under anonymous prices, we know item i will be bought so long as vji (ei) is at least the price of item
i. Once the items bought are fixed, profit is linear. Therefore, there are m hyperplanes splitting
Rm into regions where profit is linear. The analysis for non-anonymous prices is similar.
2.1.4 Auctions
We now present applications of Theorem 2.2 to auctions.
Second price item auctions with item reserves. These auctions are only strategy proof for
additive bidders, so we restrict our attention to this setting. In the case of non-anonymous reserves,
there is a price pj (ei) for each item i and each bidder j. The bidders submit bids on the items. For
each item i, the highest bidder j wins the item if her bid is above pj (ei). She pays the maximum
of the second highest bid and pj (ei). If the bidder with the highest bid bids below her reserve, the
item goes unsold. In the case of anonymous reserves, p1 (ei) = p2 (ei) = · · · = pn (ei) for each item
i.
Theorem 2.10. Let M and M′ be the classes of anonymous and non-anonymous second price
item auctions. Then M is (m,m)-delineable and M′ is (nm,m)-delineable.
Proof sketch. Given a vector v ∈ X , let ji be the highest bidder for item i and let j′i be the second
highest bidder. Under anonymous prices, there are 2m hyperplanes splitting Rm into regions
where profit is linear; they correspond to whether or not vji (ei) ≥ p (ei), and whether or not
vj′i (ei) ≥ p (ei). The analysis for non-anonymous prices follows similarly.
Mixed bundling auctions with reserve prices (MBARPs). MBARPs (Tang and Sandholm,
2012) are a variation on the VCG mechanism with item reserve prices, with an additional fixed
boost to the social welfare of any allocation where some bidder receives the grand bundle. Recall
that in a single-item VCG auction (i.e., second-price auction) with a reserve price, the item is only
sold if the highest bidder’s bid exceeds the reserve price, and the winner must pay the maximum
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of the second highest bid and the reserve price. To generalize this intuition to the multi-item case,
we enlarge the set of agents to include the seller, whose valuation for a set of items is the set’s
reserve price. An MBARP gives an additional additive boost to the social welfare of any allocation
where some bidder receives the grand bundle, and then runs the VCG mechanism over this enlarged
set of bidders. The allocation is the boosted social welfare maximizer and the payments are the
VCG payments on the boosted social welfare values. Importantly, the seller makes no payments,
no matter her allocation.
Formally, MBARPs are defined by a parameter γ ≥ 0 and m reserve prices p (e1) , . . . , p (em).
Let λ be a function such that λ (Q) = γ if some bidder receives the grand bundle under allocation
Q and 0 otherwise. For an allocation Q, let qQ be the items not allocated. Given a valuation vector
v, the MBARP allocation is
Q∗ = (q∗1, . . . , q
∗
n) = argmax

n∑
j=1
vj (qj) +
∑
i:qQ[i]=1
p (ei) + λ (Q)− c (Q)
 .
Using the notation
Q−j =
(
q−j1 , . . . , q
−j
n
)
= argmax
∑
`6=j
v` (q`) +
∑
i:qQ[i]=1
p (ei) + λ (Q)− c (Q)
 ,
bidder j pays∑
6`=j
v`
(
q−j`
)
+
∑
i:q
Q−j [i]=1
p (ei) + λ
(
Q−j
)− c (Q−j)−∑
` 6=j
v` (q
∗
` )−
∑
i:qQ∗ [i]=1
p (ei)− λ (Q∗) + c (Q∗) .
Theorem 2.11. Let M be the set of MBARPs. Then M is (m+ 1, (n+ 1) 22m)-delineable.
Proof sketch. Each MBARP is defined by m+1 parameters: the m reserves and the fixed boost for
the grand bundle allocations. To compute the boosted VCG payments, it is necessary to compute
n + 1 allocations: the allocation maximizing boosted social welfare with all bidders participating
and the allocation without each bidder in turn. We show that there are (n+ 1) 22m hyperplanes
delineating regions of Rm+1 where these allocations are fixed, in which case profit is linear.
Affine maximizer auctions (AMAs). AMAs are an expressive mechanism class: Roberts
(1979) proved that AMAs are the only ex post truthful mechanisms over unrestricted value domains.
Later, Lavi et al. (2003) proved that under natural assumptions, every truthful multi-item auction
is an “almost” AMA, that is, an AMA for sufficiently high values. An AMA is defined by a
weight per bidder wj ∈ R>0 and a boost per allocation λ (Q) ∈ R≥0. By increasing any wj or
λ (Q), the seller can increase bidder j’s bids or increase the likelihood that Q is the auction’s
allocation. The AMA allocation Q∗ is the one which maximizes the weighted social welfare, i.e.,
Q∗ = (q∗1, . . . , q∗n) = argmax
{∑n
j=1wjvj (qj) + λ (Q)− c (Q)
}
. The payments have the same form
as the VCG payments, with the parameters factored in to ensure truthfulness. Formally, using the
notation Q−j =
(
q−j1 , . . . , q
−j
n
)
= argmax
{∑
` 6=j w`v` (q`) + λ (Q)− c (Q)
}
, each bidder j pays
1
wj
∑
6`=j
w`v`
(
q−j`
)
+ λ
(
Q−j
)− c (Q−j)−
∑
` 6=j
w`v` (q
∗
` ) + λ (Q
∗)− c (Q∗)
 .
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Virtual valuation combinational auctions (VVCAs) (Likhodedov and Sandholm, 2004) are a
special case of AMAs where each λ (Q) is split into n terms such that λ (Q) =
∑n
j=1 λj (Q) where
λj (Q) = cj,q for all allocations Q that give bidder j exactly bundle q. Finally, λ-auctions (Jehiel
et al., 2007) are a special case of AMAs where the bidder weights equal 1.
Theorem 2.12. Let M, M′, and M′′ be the classes of AMAs, VVCAs, and λ-auctions, re-
spectively. Then M is
(
O (n (n+ 1)m) , (n+ 1)2m+1
)
-delineable, M′ is
(
O
(
n22m
)
, (n+ 1)2m+1
)
-
delineable, and M′′ is
(
(n+ 1)m , (n+ 1)2m+1
)
-delineable.
Proof sketch. The AMA profit function is not piecewise linear in its parameters since it involves di-
viding by the bidder weights. Therefore, we map the parameters into an O (n (n+ 1)m)-dimensional
space over which profit is piecewise linear. We show that this higher-dimensional space can be par-
titioned by (n+ 1)2m+1 hyperplanes so that within any one region, the allocation with all bidders
participating and the allocations without each bidder in turn are fixed, which means that the
VCG-style payments are linear in this higher dimensional space.
Theorem 2.12 implies exponentially-many samples are sufficient to ensure that empirical and
expected profit are close. Balcan et al. (2016) prove an exponential number of samples is also
necessary.
We now study two hierarchies of AMAs. In Section 4, we show how to learn which level of the
hierarchy optimizes the tradeoff between generalization and profit for the setting at hand.
Q-boosted AMAs and λ-auctions. Let Q be a set of allocations. The set of Q-boosted AMAs
(resp., λ-auctions) consists of all AMAs (resp., λ-auctions) where only allocations in Q are boosted.
In other words, if λ (Q) > 0, then Q ∈ Q.
Theorem 2.13. Let M and M′ be the classes of Q-boosted AMAs and λ-auctions. Then M is(
O (n (n+ |Q|)) , (n+ 1)2(m+1)
)
-delineable and M′ is
(
|Q|, (n+ 1) (|Q|+ 1)2
)
-delineable.
Proof sketch. This proof is similar to that of Theorem 2.12, but we need not map into as high-
dimensional a space as in that proof since there are fewer parameters defining each auction.
3 Data-dependent generalization guarantees
In this section, we provide two data-dependent means of strengthening the results in Section 2
when the underlying distribution is “well-behaved.” The first applies to bidders whose values
are drawn from item-independent distributions and mechanisms whose profit functions decompose
additively. For example, under item-pricing mechanisms, the profit function decomposes into the
profit obtained from selling item 1, plus the profit obtained by selling item 2, and so on. We obtain
surprisingly strong guarantees in this setting: our bounds do not depend on the number of items
and under anonymous prices, they do not depend on the number of bidders either.
Second, we provide tools for deriving generalization guarantees that are robust to outliers.
Our worst-case bounds from Section 2 grow linearly with the maximum profit achievable over the
support of the distribution. These bounds are thus pessimistic when the highest valuations in the
support have low probability mass. We show how to obtain stronger guarantees in this setting.
To obtain our data-dependent guarantees, we move from pseudo-dimension to Rademacher com-
plexity (Bartlett and Mendelson, 2002; Koltchinskii, 2001), which allows us to prove distribution-
dependent generalization guarantees. This is the key advantage of Rademacher complexity over
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pseudo-dimension; pseudo-dimension implies generalization guarantees that are worst-case over the
distribution whereas Rademacher complexity implies distribution-dependent guarantees. We prove
that this shift to Rademacher complexity from pseudo-dimension is in fact necessary in order to
obtain guarantees that are independent of the number of items (Theorem 3.6).
We now define Rademacher complexity. Given a set S = {v(1), . . . ,v(N)}, the empirical
Rademacher complexity of M with respect to S is defined as
R̂S (M) = Eσ
[
sup
M∈M
1
N
N∑
i=1
σi · profitM
(
v(i)
)]
,
where σi ∼ U ({−1, 1}). With probability 1 − δ over the draw S ∼ DN , for any M ∈ M,
|profitS (M)−profitD (M) | = O
(
R̂S (M) + U
√
ln (1/δ) /N
)
(e.g., Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David
(2014)). Rademacher complexity and pseudo-dimension are closely connected:
Theorem 3.1 (Pollard (1984)). For any mechanism class M, R̂S (M) = O
(
U
√
Pdim (M) /N
)
.
3.1 Stronger guarantees for additively-decomposable classes
In the following corollary of Theorem 2.2, we show that if the profit functions of a classM decom-
pose additively into a number of simpler functions, then we can easily bound R̂S (M) using the
Rademacher complexity of those simpler functions. We then demonstrate the power of this corol-
lary by proving stronger guarantees for many well-studied mechanism classes when the bidders are
additive and their valuations are drawn from item-independent distributions. This includes bidders
with values drawn from product distributions as a special case, which have been extensively studied
in the mechanism design literature (e.g., (Cai and Daskalakis, 2017; Yao, 2014; Cai et al., 2016;
Goldner and Karlin, 2016; Babaioff et al., 2017; Hart and Nisan, 2012)).
We say that a mechanism class M parameterized by vectors p ∈ Rd decomposes additively if
for all p ∈ Rd, there exist T functions f1,p, . . . , fT,p such that the function profitp can be written
as profitp (·) = f1,p (·) + · · ·+ fT,p (·).
Corollary 3.2. Suppose that M is a set of additively decomposable mechanisms parameterized by
vectors p ∈ P. Moreover, suppose that for all p ∈ P, the range of fi,p over the support of D is
[0, Ui] and that the class {fi,p : p ∈ P} is (di, ti)-delineable. Then for any set of samples S ∼ DN ,
R̂S (M) = O
(∑T
i=1 Ui
√
di log (diti) /N
)
.
Proof. The corollary follows from Theorems 2.2 and 3.1, and the fact that for any sets G and G′ of
functions mapping X to R and any set S ⊆ X , R̂S ({g + g′ : g ∈ G, g′ ∈ G′}) ≤ R̂S (G)+R̂S (G′).
We now instantiate Corollary 3.2 for several mechanism classes. The full proofs are in Ap-
pendix B.
Theorem 3.3. Let M and M′ be the sets of second-price auctions with anonymous and non-
anonymous reserves. Suppose the bidders are additive, D is item-independent, and the cost function
is additive. For any set S ∼ DN , R̂S (M) ≤ O
(
U
√
1/N
)
and R̂S (M′) ≤ O
(
U
√
n log n/N
)
.
Proof sketch. We decompose profitp into m profit functions profit1,p, . . . ,profitm,p, where profiti,p
is the profit obtained from selling item i. We then prove that each class
{
profiti,p : p ∈ Rm≥0
}
is
(1, 1)-delineable and that U = U1 + · · ·+ Um since D is item-independent.
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The following theorem follows from the same logic as Theorem 3.3.
Theorem 3.4. Let M and M′ be the sets of anonymous and non-anonymous item-pricing mech-
anisms, respectively. Suppose the bidders are additive, D is item-independent, and the cost func-
tion is additive. For any set of samples S ∼ DN , R̂S (M) ≤ O
(
U
√
1/N
)
and R̂S (M′) ≤
O
(
U
√
n log n/N
)
.
Menus of item lotteries. A length-` item lottery menu is a set of ` lotteries per item. The
menu for item i is Mi =
{(
φ
(0)
i , p
(0)
i
)
,
(
φ
(1)
i , p
(1)
i
)
, . . . ,
(
φ
(`)
i , p
(`)
i
)}
, where φ
(0)
i = p
(0)
i = 0. The
buyer chooses one lottery
(
φ
(ji)
i , p
(ji)
i
)
per menu Mi, pays
∑m
i=1 p
(ji), and receives each item i with
probability φ
(ji)
i .
Theorem 3.5. Let M be the set of length-` item lottery menus. If the bidder is additive, D
is item-independent, and the cost function is additive, then for any set S ∼ DN , R̂S (M) ≤
O
(
U
√
` log `/N
)
.
Proof sketch. The theorem follows from proving that the class of all single-item lotteries Mi is(
2`, `2
)
-delineable. We prove this by showing that the lottery the buyer chooses depends on
(
`+1
2
)
hyperplanes, one per pair of lotteries. Once the lottery is fixed, profitMi (v) is a linear function.
Finally, we prove lower bounds showing that one could not hope to prove the generalization
guarantees implied by Theorems 3.3 and 3.4 using pseudo-dimension alone.
Theorem 3.6. Let M and M′ be the classes of anonymous and non-anonymous item-pricing
mechanisms. Then Pdim (M) ≥ m and Pdim (M′) ≥ nm. The same holds if M and M′ are the
classes of second-price auctions with anonymous and non-anonymous reserves.
We sketch the proof for one case. The full proof is in Appendix B.
Proof sketch. LetM be the class of anonymous item-pricing mechanisms over one additive bidder.
Let v(i) be a vector where v
(i)
1 (ei) = 3 and v
(i)
1 (ej) = 0 for all j 6= i and let S =
{
v(1), . . . ,v(m)
}
.
For any T ⊆ [m], let MT be the mechanism defined such that the price of item i is 2 if i ∈ T
and otherwise, its price is 0. If i ∈ T , then profitMT
(
v(i)
)
= 2 and otherwise, profitMT
(
v(i)
)
= 0.
Therefore, the targets z(1) = · · · = z(m) = 1 witness the shattering of S by M.
3.2 Stronger guarantees in the presence of outliers
We now show that even if there are occasionally outliers with unusually high valuations, the em-
pirical Rademacher complexity need not be blown out of proportion based on those outliers.
Theorem 3.7. For a valuation vector v, let MPM (v) be the maximum profit achievable by mech-
anisms in M. Suppose that with probability at least 1 − b, MPM (v) ≤ a. With probability 1 − δ
over the draw of a sample S ∼ DN ,
R̂S (M) = O

√√√√Pdim (M)
N
(
a2 + U2
(
b+
√
1
N3
log
1
δ
)) .
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Proof sketch. First, we split the sample into two groups L and B. The set L consists of all v ∈ S
such that MPM (v) ≤ a and B = S \ L. We then split the Rademacher complexity formula
up between the sets L and B, proving that NR̂S (M) ≤ |L|R̂L (M) + |B|R̂B (M). We use a
Chernoff bound to show that with high probability, |B| is small, and thus the summand |B|R̂B (M)
contributes little to the Rademacher complexity bound. Therefore, the importance of U in the
bound is diminished.
In the following remark, we note that it is possible to learn an estimate for a given any confidence
parameter b using a small number of samples because the VC dimension of thresholds is 1.
Remark 3.1. Let S = {v(1), . . . ,v(N)} ∼ DN be a set of samples sorted so that MPM (v(1)) ≤
· · · ≤ MPM
(
v(N)
)
. The following holds with probability at least 1 − δ over the draw of S. For
any b ∈ (0, 1), let i = bbNc. Then Prv∼D[MPM (v) > MPM
(
v(i)
)
] < b+O
(√
log (1/δ) /N
)
.
There are many ways to bound MPM (v) and thus apply Remark 3.1 and Theorem 3.7. For
example, if M is the class of two-part tariffs over κ units and a single buyer, then MPM (v) =
maxq∈[κ] {v (q)− c (q)} or if M is the class of lottery menus with an additive cost function,
MPM (v) =
m∑
i=1
v (ei) 1 {v (ei) ≥ c (ei)} .
We include examples of other bounds on MPM (v) in Appendix B.
4 Structural profit maximization
In this section, we use our results from Section 2 to provide tools for optimizing the profit-
generalization tradeoff. We begin by demonstrating this tradeoff pictorially. For the sake of illus-
tration, suppose thatM is a mechanism class that decomposes into a nested sequence of subclasses
M1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Mt = M. For example, if M is the class of AMAs, then Mk could be the class
of all Q-boosted AMAs with |Q| = k. Prior work (Balcan et al., 2016) gave uniform convergence
bounds for AMAs without taking advantage of the class’s hierarchical structure. We illustrate
uniform convergence bounds in the left panel of Figure 4 with t = 4. On the x-axis, we chart
the growth in mechanism complexity, using a measure such as Rademacher complexity. On the
y-axis, for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, we plot the empirical profit over a set of samples S of the mechanism
Mi (S) ∈Mi that maximizes empirical profit. We also plot the lower bound on the expected profit
of Mi (S) which is equal to profitS (Mi (S)) − M (N, δ). This lower bound is always increasing,
so the mechanism designer may erroneously think that M4 (S) is the best mechanism to field.
Our general theorem allows us to be more careful since we can easily derive bounds Mi (N, δ)
for each class Mi. Then, we can spread the confidence parameter δ across all subsets M1, . . . ,Mt
using a weight function w : N → [0, 1] such that ∑w (i) ≤ 1. More formally, by a union bound,
we are guaranteed that with probability at least 1− δ, for all mechanisms M ∈ M, the difference
between profitS (M) and profitD (M) is at most mini:M∈Mi Mi (N, δ · w (i)). This is illustrated in
the right panel of Figure 4, where for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, the lower bound on the expected profit ofMi (S)
is its empirical profit minus Mi (N, δ · w (i)). By maximizing this complexity-dependent lower
bound on expected profit, the designer can correctly determine thatM2 (S) is a better mechanism
to field than M4 (S). Structural profit maximization (SPM) is the process of maximizing this
complexity-dependent lower bound.
Both the decomposition ofM into subsets and the choice of a weight function allow the designer
to encode his prior knowledge about the market. For example, if mechanisms inMi are likely more
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Figure 4: Uniform generalization guarantees (left panel) versus the stronger bounds via SPM (right
panel).
profitable than others, he can increase w (i). The larger the weight w (i) assigned to Mi is, the
larger δ ·w (i) is, and a larger δ ·w (i) implies a smaller Mi (N, δ · w (i)), thereby implying stronger
guarantees.
We now present an application of SPM to item pricing. Group pricing is prevalent throughout
daily life: movie theaters, amusement parks, and tourist attractions have different admission prices
per market segment, with groups such as Child, Student, Adult, and Senior Citizen. Formally, the
designer can segment the buyers into k groups and charge each group a different price. If k = 1, the
prices are anonymous and if k = n, they are non-anonymous, thus forming a mechanism hierarchy.
For k ∈ [n], let Mk be the class of non-anonymous pricing mechanisms where there are k price
groups. In other words, for all mechanisms in Mk, there is a partition of the buyers B1, . . . , Bk
such that for all t ∈ [k], all pairs of buyers j, j′ ∈ Bt, and all items i ∈ [m], pj (ei) = pj′ (ei). We
derive the following guarantee for this hierarchy.
Theorem 4.1. Let M be the class of non-anonymous item-pricing mechanisms over additive bid-
ders and let w : [n] → R be a weight function such that ∑ni=1w (i) ≤ 1. Then for any δ ∈ (0, 1),
with probability at least 1− δ over the draw S ∼ DN , for any k ∈ [n] and any mechanism M ∈Mk,
|profitS (M)− profitD (M)| = O
(
U
√
km log (nm)
N
+ U
√
1
N
log
1
δ · w (k)
)
.
Proof sketch. First, we prove that Mk is (km, nm)-delineable. The theorem then follows from
Theorems 2.1 and 2.2, and by multiplying δ with w (k).
We also prove the following theorem for the hierarchy of AMAs defined by the classes of Q-
boosted AMAs. For an AMA M , let QM be the set of all allocations Q such that λ (Q) > 0.
Theorem 4.2. Let M be the class of AMAs and let w be a weight function that maps sets of
allocations Q to [0, 1] such that ∑w (Q) ≤ 1. With probability 1 − δ over the draw S ∼ DN , for
any M ∈M,
|profitS (M)− profitD (M)| = O
(
U
√
nm (n+ |QM |) log n
N
+ U
√
1
N
log
1
δ · w (QM )
)
.
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Theorem 4.2 follows from Theorems 2.1, 2.2, and 2.13: we only need to multiply the weight
term with δ as it appears in the resulting bound. Theorems 2.7, 2.13, and 2.5 similarly imply
results for two-part tariffs, Q-boosted λ-auctions, and lottery menus (see Theorems C.1, C.2, and
C.3 in Appendix C).
5 Connection to structured prediction
In this section, we connect the hyperplane structure we investigate in this paper to the struc-
tured prediction literature in machine learning (e.g., (Collins, 2000)), thus proving even stronger
generalization bounds for item-pricing mechanisms under buyers with unit-demand and general
valuations and answering an open question by Morgenstern and Roughgarden (2016). Morgenstern
and Roughgarden (2016) used structured prediction to provide sample complexity guarantees for
several “simple” mechanism classes. They observed that these classes have profit functions which
are the composition of two simpler functions: A generalized allocation function f
(1)
p : X → Y and
a simplified profit function f
(2)
p : X × Y → R such that profitp (v) = f (2)p
(
v, f
(1)
p (v)
)
. For exam-
ple, Y might be the set of allocations. In this case, we say that M is (F (1),F (2))-decomposable,
where F (1) =
{
f
(1)
p : p ∈ P
}
and F (2) =
{
f
(2)
p : p ∈ P
}
. See Example D.1 in Appendix D for an
example of this decomposition. Morgenstern and Roughgarden (2016) bound Pdim (M) using the
“complexity” of F (1), which they quantified using tools from structured prediction, namely, linear
separability.
Definition 5.1 (a-dimensionally linearly separable). A set of functions F = {fp : X → Y | p ∈ P}
is a-dimensionally linearly separable if there exists a function ψ : X ×Y → Ra and a vector wp ∈ Ra
for each p ∈ P such that fp (v) ∈ argmaxα∈Y〈wp, ψ (v,α)〉 and |argmaxα∈Y〈wp, ψ (v,α)〉| = 1.
IfM is (F (1),F (2))-decomposable and F (1) is a-dimensionally linearly separable over Y, we say
that M is a-dimensionally linearly separable over Y.
The bounds Morgenstern and Roughgarden (2016) provided using linear separability are loose
in several settings: for anonymous and non-anonymous item-pricing mechanisms under additive
bidders, their structured prediction approach gives a pseudo-dimension bound of O
(
m2
)
and
O
(
nm2 logm
)
, respectively. They left as an open question whether linear separability can be
used to prove tighter guarantees. Using the hyperplane structures we study in this paper, we prove
that the answer is “yes.” We require the following refined notion of (d, t)-delineable classes.
Definition 5.2 ((d, t1, t2)-divisible). SupposeM consists of mechanisms parameterized by vectors
p ⊆ Rd and that M is (F (1),F (2))-decomposable. We say that M is (d, t1, t2)-divisible if:
1. For any v ∈ X , there is a set H of t1 hyperplanes such that for any connected component P ′
of Rd \ H, the function f (1)v (p) is constant over all p ∈ P ′.
2. For any v ∈ X and any α ∈ Y, there is a set H2 of t2 hyperplanes such that for any connected
component P ′ of Rd \ H2, the function f (2)v,α (p) is linear over all p ∈ P ′.
Note that (d, t1, t2)-divisibility implies (d, t1 + t2)-delineability. Theorem 5.1 connects linear
separability and divisibility with pseudo-dimension. The full proof is in Appendix D.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose M is mechanism class that is (d, t1, t2)-divisible with t1, t2 ≥ 1 and
a-dimensionally linearly separable over Y. Let ω = min
{
|Y|a, d (at1)d
}
. Then Pdim (M) =
O ((d+ a) log (d+ a) + d log t2 + logω).
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Proof sketch. Suppose that N is the pseudo-dimension of M. Let S = {v(1), . . . ,v(N)} be a
shatterable set of size N and let z(1), . . . , z(N) be the corresponding witnesses. Morgenstern and
Roughgarden (2016) showed that N must be bounded by the product of the following quantities:
1. The number of subsets of S of size a, times the number of ways to label those subsets using
functions from F (1).
2. Roughly speaking, the size of the following vector set, maximized over all α(1), . . . ,α(N) ∈ Y:{(
1
(
f
(2)
p
(
v(1),α(1)
) ≥ z(1)) , . . . ,1(f (2)p (v(N),α(N)) ≥ z(N))) : p ∈ P} .
First, we prove the first quantity is bounded by ω = Na ·min
{
|Y|a, d (at1)d
}
. An obvious upper
bound on this quantity is
(
N
a
) · |Y|a ≤ Na|Y|a. When |Y| is large, we prove a more refined bound
of d (at1)
d by using the fact that for any subset S ′ ⊆ S of size a, there are at1 hyperplanes splitting
Rd into regions over which f (1)v (p) is constant for all v ∈ S ′, and there are d (at1)d such regions
(Buck, 1943). We use a similar argument to bound the second quantity.
5.1 Divisible mechanism classes
We instantiate Theorem 5.1 with full proofs in Appendix D.
Theorem 5.2. Let M and M′ be the classes of item-pricing mechanisms with anonymous prices
and non-anonymous prices. If the buyers are unit-demand, then M is (m,nm2, 1)-divisible and
M′ is (nm, nm2, 1)-divisible. Also, M and M′ are (m+ 1)- and (nm+ 1)-dimensionally lin-
early separable over {0, 1}m and [n]m. Therefore, Pdim (M) = O (min{m2,m log (nm)}) and
Pdim (M′) = O (nm log(nm)).
Proof sketch. We begin with anonymous reserves. Let f
(1)
p : X → {0, 1}m be defined so that the
ith component is 1 if and only if item i is sold. Each buyer j’s preference ordering over the items
is determined by the
(
m
2
)
hyperplanes vj (ei) − p (ei) ≥ vj (ei′) − p (ei′) for all i, i′ ∈ [m]. In any
region where his preference ordering is fixed, f
(1)
v (p) is constant. So long as the allocation is fixed,
profit is linear, which is why t2 = 1 in both cases. Morgenstern and Roughgarden (2016) proved
the bounds on linear separability.
When prices are anonymous, if n < 2m, Theorem 5.2 improves on the pseudo-dimension bound
of O
(
m2
)
Morgenstern and Roughgarden (2016) gave for this class, and otherwise it matches their
bound. When the prices are non-anonymous our bound improves on their bound of O
(
nm2 log n
)
.
Theorem 5.3. Let M and M′ be the classes of item-pricing mechanisms with anonymous prices
and non-anonymous prices, respectively. If the buyers have general values, thenM is (m,n22m, 1)-
divisible and M′ is (nm, n22m, 1)-divisible. Also, M is (m+ 1)-dimensionally linearly separable
over {0, 1}m and M′ is (nm+ 1)-dimensionally linearly separable over [n]m. Thus, Pdim (M) =
O
(
m2
)
and Pdim (M′) = O (nm (m+ log n)).
Proof sketch. The proof is similar to Theorem 5.2’s, except there are
(
2m
2
)
hyperplanes per bidder
defining their preference ordering on the bundles: one for each pair of bundles. This amounts to at
most t1 = n2
2m hyperplanes splitting Rm into regions where the items allocated are fixed.
When there are anonymous prices, the number of hyperplanes in the partition is large, so
considering the hyperplane partition does not help us. As a result, Theorem 5.3 implies the same
19
bound Morgenstern and Roughgarden (2016) gave. In the case of non-anonymous prices, analyzing
the hyperplane partition gives a better bound than their bound of O
(
nm2 log n
)
.
In Theorem D.3 in Appendix D, we use Theorem 5.1 to prove pseudo-dimension bounds of
O (m logm) and O (nm log nm) for the classes of second price auctions for additive bidders with
anonymous and non-anonymous reserves, respectively. In Theorem D.4, we prove the same for
item-pricing mechanisms. We thus answer the open question by Morgenstern and Roughgarden
(2016). These bounds match those implied by Theorems 2.9 and 2.10.
6 Comparison of our results to prior research
Morgenstern and Roughgarden (2016) studied “simple” multi-item mechanisms: item-pricing mech-
anisms and second-price item auctions. See Section 5.1, Table 1, and Table 2 for a comparison of
our guarantees. Balcan et al. (2016) provided generalization guarantees for AMAs, λ-auctions,
VVCAs, and MBARPs. See Table 1c in Section 1 for a comparison of our guarantees.
Syrgkanis (2017) provided generalization guarantees specifically for the mechanism that maxi-
mizes empirical revenue. This is in contrast to our bounds, which apply uniformly to every mecha-
nism in a given class. This is crucial when it may not be computationally feasible to determine an
empirically optimal mechanism, but only an approximation. Syrgkanis (2017) analyzed multi-item,
multi-bidder item-pricing mechanisms when the bidders have additive valuations and there is no
supplier cost. LetM be this mechanism class with anonymous prices and letM′ be this class with
non-anonymous prices. For a set S of samples, letM (S) andM′ (S) be the mechanisms inM and
M′ that maximize empirical revenue. Syrgkanis (2017) proved that with probability 1− δ over the
draw of S ∼ DN , |profitD (M (S))−maxM∈M profitD (M)| = O
(
(U/δ)
√
m log (nN) /N
)
. When
D is item-independent, our bound of O
(
U
√
log (1/δ) /N
)
improves over this bound. Otherwise,
our bound of O
(
U
√
m log (m) /N + U
√
log (1/δ) /N
)
is incomparable. Further, Syrgkanis (2017)
proved that |profitD (M′ (S))−maxM∈M′ profitD (M)| = O
(
(U/δ)
√
nm log (N) /N
)
. Our bound
of O
(
U
√
nm log (nm) /N + U
√
log (1/δ) /N
)
is incomparable.
Cai and Daskalakis (2017) provided learning algorithms that return mechanisms whose ex-
pected revenue is a constant fraction of the optimal revenue obtainable by any randomized and
Bayesian truthful mechanism. As we describe in Section 1, under additive buyers, we completely
remove the dependence on the number of items from their algorithm’s sample complexity guar-
antee. When the bidders are unit-demand, their algorithm returns a non-anonymous item-pricing
mechanism. Based on work by Morgenstern and Roughgarden (2016), their algorithm has a sample
complexity guarantee of O
(
(U/)2
(
nm2 log n+ log (1/δ)
))
. Via Theorem 3.4, we improve this to
O
(
(U/)2 (nm log (nm) + log (1/δ))
)
. They also provided algorithms for bidders with other types
of valuations, such as subadditive and XOS. In these cases, their algorithms return item-pricing
mechanisms with entry fees. Our main theorem would provide pessimistic guarantees for these
mechanisms due to the exponentially large number of parameters. To circumvent this, their proofs
use specific structural properties exhibited by bidders with product distributions, whereas the pri-
mary focus of this paper is to provide a general theory applicable to many different mechanisms
and buyer types.
Medina and Vassilvitskii (2017) studied single-bidder, multi-item pricing in a different model
from ours, where there is no bound on the number of items but each item is defined by a feature
vector. Their pricing algorithm has access to a bid predictor mapping from feature vectors to bids.
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They related their algorithm’s performance to the bid predictor’s accuracy, among other factors.
Devanur et al. (2016) studied several single-item auction classes, including the class M of
second price item auctions with non-anonymous reserves and no cost function. They proved that
N = O
(
(U/)2 (n log (U/) + log (1/δ))
)
samples are sufficient to ensure that with probability 1−δ
over the draw S ∼ DN , for all M ∈M, |profitS (M)− profitD (M)| ≤ . Our Theorem 2.10 for the
multi-item case, specialized to the single-item setting, implies that O
(
(U/)2 (n log n+ log (1/δ))
)
samples are sufficient, which is incomparable to Devanur et al.’s bound due to the log factors.
7 Conclusion
In this work, we prove generalization guarantees by taking advantage of structure shared by a
diverse array of mechanisms: for a fixed set of buyer values, profit is a piecewise linear function of
the mechanism’s parameters. We relate the intrinsic complexity of a given mechanism class to the
complexity of the partition breaking the parameter space into linear portions. We thus derive strong
guarantees for many widely-studied mechanism classes, including lotteries, pricing mechanisms, and
auctions. We both prove new bounds for mechanism classes not yet studied in the sample-based
mechanism design literature, and match or improve over the best known guarantees for many
mechanism classes. We provide data-dependent generalization guarantees which strengthen our
main theorem when the underlying distribution over buyers’ values is “well-behaved.” Finally,
we analyze hierarchical structures breaking up the mechanism classes we study and show how
to pinpoint the level in the hierarchy that optimizes the tradeoff between empirical profit and
generalization.
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A Proofs from Section 2
Lemma A.1 (Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David (2014)). Let a ≥ 1 and b > 0. Then x < a log x+ b
implies that x < 4a log(2a) + 2b.
Theorem 2.2. If M is (d, t)-delineable, the pseudo dimension of M is O (d log (dt)).
Proof. Suppose Pdim(M) = N . By definition, there exists a set S = {v(1), . . . ,v(N)} that is
shattered by M. Let z(1), . . . , z(N) ∈ R be the points that witness this shattering. Again, by
definition, we know that for any T ⊆ [N ], there exists a parameter vector pT ∈ P such that if
i ∈ T , then profitpT
(
v(i)
) ≥ z(i) and if i 6∈ T , then profitpT (v(i)) < z(i). Let P∗ = {pT : T ⊆ [N ]}.
To show that the pseudo-dimension N ofM is O(d log(dt)), we will show that |P∗| = 2N < dNddtd,
which means that N = O(d log(dt)).
To this end, for v(i) ∈ S, let H(i) be the set of t hyperplanes such that for any connected
component P ′ of P \ H(i), profitv(i) (p) is linear over P ′. We now consider the overlay of all N
partitions P \ H(1), . . . ,P \ H(N). Formally, this overlay is made up of the sets P1, . . . ,Pτ , which
are the connected components of P\
(⋃N
i=1H(i)
)
. For each set Pj and each i ∈ [N ], Pj is completely
contained in a single connected component of P \H(i), which means that profitv(i) (p) is linear over
Pj . (See Figures 3a, 3b, and 3c for illustrations.) As we know from work by Buck (1943), since∣∣H(i)∣∣ ≤ t for all i ∈ [N ], τ < d(Nt)d.
Now, consider a single connected component Pj of P \
(⋃N
i=1H(i)
)
. For any sample v(i) ∈ S, we
know that profitv(i) (p) is linear over Pj . Let a(i)j ∈ Rd and b(i)j ∈ R be the weight vector and offset
such that profitv(i) (p) = a
(i)
j ·p+b(i)j for all p ∈ Pj . We know that there is a hyperplane a(i)j ·p+b(i)j =
z(i) where on one side of the hyperplane, profitv(i) (p) ≤ z(i) and on the other side, profitv(i) (p) >
z(i). Let HPj be all N hyperplanes for all N samples, i.e., HPj =
{
a
(i)
j · p+ b(i)j = z(i) : i ∈ [N ]
}
.
Notice that in any connected component P ′ of Pj \HPj , for all i ∈ [N ], profitv(i) (p) is either greater
than z(i) or less than z(i) (but not both) for all p ∈ P ′. (See Figure 3d for an illustration.) Thus,
at most one vector p ∈ P∗ can come from P ′. In total, the number of connected components of
Pj \ HPj is smaller than dNd. The same holds for every partition Pj . Thus, the total number
of regions where for all i ∈ [N ], profitv(i) (p) is either greater than z(i) or less than z(i) (but not
both) is smaller than dNd · d(Nt)d. We may bound |P∗| = 2N < dNd · d(Nt)d, which means that
N < 2d logN + 2 log d + d log t. By Lemma A.1, with a = 2d, b = 2 log d + d log t, and x = N , we
have that N < 8d log(4d) + d log t+ 2 log d ≤ 9d log(4dt) = O(d log(dt)).
Lemma A.2. For all v ∈ X and all M ∈M, profitM (v) = Ez
[
profit′M (v, z)
]
.
Proof. By definition of profit′m,
Ez
[
profit′M (v, z)
]
= Ez
pv − c
 ∑
j:z[j]<φv [j]
ej

= pv −
∑
r∈{0,1}m
c (r)
∏
j:r[j]=1
Pr [z[j] < φv[j]]
∏
j:r[j]=0
Pr [z[j] ≥ φv[j]]
= pv −
∑
r∈{0,1}m
c (r)
∏
j:r[j]=1
φv[j]
∏
j:r[j]=0
(1− φv[j]) .
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Valuations Auction class Our bounds Prior bounds
Additive or
unit-
demand
Length-` lottery menu U
√
`m log(`m)/N N/A
Additive,
item-
independent∗
Length-` item lottery menu U
√
` log `/N N/A
(a) Rademacher complexity bounds in big-O for lotteries.
Valuations Mechanism class Price class Our bounds Prior bounds
General Length-` menus of
two-part tariffs
over κ units
Anonymous U
√
` log(κn`)/N N/A
Non-anonymous U
√
n` log(κn`)/N N/A
Non-linear pricing Anonymous U
√
m
∏m
i=1(κi + 1)/N
†‡ N/A
Non-anonymous U
√
nm
∏m
i=1(κi + 1)/N
†‡ N/A
Additively
decomposable
non-linear pricing
Anonymous U
√
m
∑m
i=1 κi/N
†‡ N/A
Non-anonymous U
√
nm
∑m
i=1 κi/N
†‡ N/A
Item-pricing Anonymous U
√
m2/N U
√
m2/N§
Non-anonymous U
√
nm(m+ logn)/N U
√
nm2 logn/N§
Unit-
demand
Item-pricing Anonymous U
√
m ·min{m, log(nm)}/N U√m2/N§
Non-anonymous U
√
nm log(nm)/N U
√
nm2 logn/N§
Additive Item-pricing Anonymous U
√
m logm/N U
√
m logm/N§
Non-anonymous U
√
nm log(nm)/N U
√
nm log(nm)/N§
Additive,
item-
independent∗
Item-pricing Anonymous U
√
1/N U
√
m logm/N§
Non-anonymous U
√
n logn/N U
√
nm log(nm)/N§
(b) Rademacher complexity bounds in big-O for pricing mechanisms.
Valuations Auction class Our bounds Prior bounds
General AMAs and λ-auctions U
√
nm+1m logn/N cU
√
m/Nnm+2
(
n2 +
√
nm
)†¶‖
VVCAs U
√
n2m2m logn/N cU
√
m/Nnm+2
(
n2 +
√
nm
)†¶‖
MBARPs U
√
m(logn+m)/N U
√
m3 logn/N¶
Additive Second price item auctions with
anonymous reserve prices
U
√
m logm/N U
√
m logm/N§
Second price item auctions with
non-anonymous reserve prices
U
√
nm log(nm)/N U
√
nm log(nm)/N§
Additive,
item-
independent∗
Second price item auctions with
anonymous reserve prices
U
√
1/N U
√
m logm/N§
Second price item auctions with
non-anonymous reserve prices
U
√
n logn/N U
√
nm log(nm)/N§
(c) Rademacher complexity bounds in big-O for auction classes.
∗ Additive cost function; † Ignoring log factors; ‖ The value of c > 1 depends on the range of the auction parameters;
§ Morgenstern and Roughgarden (2016); ¶ Balcan et al. (2016); ‡ κi is an upper bound on the number of units available
of item i.
Table 2: Our Rademacher complexity bounds.
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From the other direction,
profitM (v) = pv − Eq∼φv [c(q)]
= pv −
∑
r∈{0,1}m
c (r)
∏
j:r[j]=1
Pr [q[j] = 1]
∏
j:r[j]=0
Pr [q[j] = 0]
= pv −
∑
r∈{0,1}m
c (r)
∏
j:r[j]=1
φv[j]
∏
j:r[j]=0
(1− φv[j]) .
Therefore, profitM (v) = Ez
[
profit′M (v, z)
]
.
Theorem 2.6. With probability 1− δ over the draw of a sample {(v(1), z(1)) , . . . , (v(N), z(N))} ∼
(D × U ([0, 1])m)N , for all mechanisms M ∈M, | 1N
∑N
i=1 profit
′
M
(
v(i), z(i)
)−Ev∼D[profitM (v)]| =
O
(
U
√
Pdim (M′) /N + U√log (1/δ) /N) .
Proof. We know that with probability at least 1− δ over the draw of a sample{(
v(1), z(1)
)
, . . . ,
(
v(N), z(N)
)}
∼ (D × U([0, 1])m)N ,
for all mechanisms M ∈M,∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
j=1
profit′M
(
v(j), z(j)
)
− Ev,z∼D×U([0,1])m
[
profit′M (v, z)
]∣∣∣∣∣∣
= O
(
U
√
Pdim(M′)
N
+ U
√
log(1/δ)
N
)
.
We also know from Lemma A.2 that
Ev,z∼D×U([0,1])m
[
profit′M (v, z)
]
= Ev∼D [profitM (v)] .
Therefore, the theorem statement holds.
Theorem 2.5. For additive and unit-demand buyers, M′ is
(
` (m+ 1) , (`+ 1)2 +m`
)
-delineable.
Proof. The buyer will prefer lottery j ∈ {0, . . . , `} so long as v · φ(j) > v · φ(k) for any k 6= j,
which amount to
(
`+1
2
)
hyperplanes in R`(m+1) defining the lottery the buyer chooses. Next, for
each lottery
(
φ(k), p(k)
)
, there are m hyperplanes determining the vector
∑
j:z[j]<φ(k)[j] ej , and thus
the cost c
(∑
j:z[j]<φ(k)[j] ej
)
. These vectors have the form z[j] = φ(k)[j]. Thus, there are a total of
`m hyperplanes determining the costs. Let H be the union of all (`+1)2 +m` hyperplanes. Within
any connected component of R`(m+1) \ H, the lottery the buyer buys is fixed and for each lottery,
c
(∑
j:z[j]<φ(k)[j] ej
)
is fixed. Therefore, profit is a linear function of the prices p(1), . . . , p(`).
Theorem 2.7. LetM andM′ be the classes of anonymous and non-anonymous length-` menus of
two-part tariffs. Then M is
(
2`, O
(
n (κ`)2
))
-delineable and M′ is
(
2n`,O
(
n (κ`)2
))
-delineable.
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Proof. In the case of anonymous prices, every length-` menu of two-part tariffs is defined by d = 2`
parameters: the fixed fee and unit price for each of the ` menu entries. Buyer j will choose the
quantity q and menu entry (p
(i)
0 , p
(i)
1 ) that maximizes vj(q) − (p(i)0 · 1q>0 + p(i)1 q). Therefore, the
quantity q and menu entry that she chooses is determined by (κ`)2 hyperplanes in Rd of the form
vj(q) − (p(i)0 · 1q>0 + p(i)1 q) ≥ vj(q′) − (p(k)0 · 1q′>0 + p(k)1 q′). In total, there are n(`κ)2 hyperplanes
that determine the menu entry and quantity demanded by all n buyers, over which profit is linear
in the fixed fees and unit prices.
In the case of non-anonymous reserve prices, the same argument holds, except that every length-
` menu of two-part tariffs is defined by 2n` parameters: for each buyer, we must set the fixed fee
and unit price for each of the ` menu entries.
Theorem 2.8. LetM andM′ be the classes of anonymous and non-anonymous non-linear pricing
mechanisms. Let K =
∏m
i=1 (κi + 1). Then M is
(
K,nK2
)
-delineable and M′ is (nK, nK2)-
delineable.
Proof. We begin by analyzing the case where there are anonymous prices. Every non-linear pricing
mechanism is defined by d =
∏m
i=1 (κi + 1) parameters because that is the number of different
bundles and there is a price per bundle. Buyer j will prefer the bundle corresponding to the quantity
vector q over the bundle corresponding to the quantity vector q′ if vj(q) − p(q) ≥ vj(q′) − p(q′).
Therefore, there are at most
∏m
i=1 (κi + 1)
2 hyperplanes in Rd determining each buyer’s preferred
bundle — one hyperplane per pair of bundles. This means that there are a total of n
∏m
i=1 (κi + 1)
2
hyperplanes in Rd such that in any one region induced by these hyperplanes, the bundles demanded
by all n buyers are fixed and profit is linear in the prices of these n bundles.
In the case of non-anonymous prices, the same argument holds, except that every non-linear
pricing mechanism is defined by n
∏m
i=1 (κi + 1) parameters — one parameter per bundle-buyer
pair.
Definition A.1 (Additively decomposable non-linear pricing mechanisms). Additively decompos-
able non-linear pricing mechanisms are a subset of non-linear pricing mechanisms where the prices
are additive over the items. Specifically, if the prices are anonymous, there exist m functions
p(i) : [κi]→ R for all i ∈ [m] such that for every quantity vector q, p(q) =
∑
i:q[i]≥1 p
(i)(q[i]). If the
prices are non-anonymous, there exist nm functions p
(i)
j : [κi]→ R for all i ∈ [m] and j ∈ [n] such
that for every quantity vector q, pj(q) =
∑
i:q[i]≥1 p
(i)
j (q[i]).
Theorem A.3. Let M and M′ be the classes of additively decomposable non-linear pricing mech-
anisms with anonymous and non-anonymous prices. ThenM is
(∑m
i=1(κi + 1), n
∏m
i=1 (κi + 1)
2
)
-
delineable and M′ is
(
n
∑m
i=1 (κi + 1) , n
∏m
i=1 (κi + 1)
2
)
-delineable.
Proof. In the case of anonymous prices, any additively decomposable non-linear pricing mechanism
is defined by d =
∑m
i=1(κi + 1) parameters. As in the proof of Theorem 2.8, there are a total of
n
∏m
i=1(κi + 1)
2 hyperplanes in Rd such that in any one region induced by these hyperplanes, the
bundles demanded by all n buyers are fixed and profit is linear in the prices of these n bundles.
In the case of non-anonymous prices, the same argument holds, except that every non-linear
pricing mechanism is defined by n
∑m
i=1(κi + 1) parameters — one parameter per item, quantity,
and buyer tuple.
Theorem 2.9. Let M and M′ be the classes of item-pricing mechanisms with anonymous prices
and non-anonymous prices, respectively. If the buyers are additive, then M is (m,m)-delineable
and M′ is (nm, nm)-delineable.
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Proof. In the case of anonymous prices, every item-pricing mechanisms is defined by m prices
p ∈ Rm, so the parameter space is Rm. Let ji be the buyer with the highest value for item i. We
know that item i will be bought so long as vji(ei) ≥ p(ei). Once the items bought are fixed, profit
is linear. Therefore, there are m hyperplanes splitting Rm into regions where profit is linear.
In the case of non-anonymous prices, the parameter space is Rnm since there is a price per buyer
and per item. The items each buyer j is willing to buy is defined by m hyperplanes: vj(ei) ≥ pj(ei).
So long as these preferences are fixed, profit is a linear function of the prices. Therefore, there are
nm hyperplanes splitting Rnm into regions where profit is linear.
Theorem 2.10. Let M and M′ be the classes of anonymous and non-anonymous second price
item auctions. Then M is (m,m)-delineable and M′ is (nm,m)-delineable.
Proof. For a given valuation vector v, let ji be the highest bidder for item i and let j
′
i be the second
highest bidder. Under anonymous prices, item i will be bought so long as vji(ei) ≥ p(ei). If buyer
ji buys item i, his payment depends on whether or not vj′i(ei) ≥ p(ei). Therefore, there are t = 2m
hyperplanes splitting Rm into regions where profit is linear. In the case of non-anonymous prices,
the only difference is that the parameter space is Rnm.
Theorem 2.11. Let M be the set of MBARPs. Then M is (m+ 1, (n+ 1) 22m)-delineable.
Proof. An MBARP is defined by m + 1 parameters since there is one reserve per item and one
allocation boost. Let K = (n+ 1)m be the total number of allocations. Fix some valuation vector
v. We claim that the allocation of any MBARP is determined by at most (n + 1)K2 hyperplanes
in Rm+1. To see why this is, let Qk =
(
qk1 , . . . , q
k
n
)
and Q` =
(
q`1, . . . , q
`
n
)
be any two allocations
and let qQk and qQ` be the bundles of items not allocated. Consider the
(
K
2
)
hyperplanes defined
as
n∑
i=1
vi
(
q`i
)
+
∑
j:q
Q`
[i]=1
p (ei) + λ
(
Q`
)
− c
(
Q`
)
=
n∑
i=1
vi
(
qki
)
+
∑
j:q
Qk
[i]=1
p (ei) + λ
(
Qk
)
− c
(
Qk
)
.
In the intersection of these
(
K
2
)
hyperplanes, the allocation of the MBARP is fixed.
By a similar argument, it is straightforward to see that K2 hyperplanes determine the allocation
of any MBARP in this restricted space without any one bidder’s participation. This leads us to
a total of (n + 1)K2 hyperplanes which partition the space of MBARP parameters in a way such
that for any two parameter vectors in the same region, the auction allocations are the same, as are
the allocations without any one bidder’s participation. Once these allocations are fixed, profit is a
linear function in this parameter space.
Theorem 2.12. Let M, M′, and M′′ be the classes of AMAs, VVCAs, and λ-auctions, re-
spectively. Then M is
(
O (n (n+ 1)m) , (n+ 1)2m+1
)
-delineable, M′ is
(
O
(
n22m
)
, (n+ 1)2m+1
)
-
delineable, and M′′ is
(
(n+ 1)m , (n+ 1)2m+1
)
-delineable.
Proof. Let K = (n+ 1)m be the total number of allocations and let p be a parameter vector where
the first n components correspond to the bidder weights wj for j ∈ [n], the next n components
correspond to 1/wj for j ∈ [n], the next 2
(
n
2
)
components correspond to wi/wj for all i 6= j, the next
K components correspond to λ(Q) for every allocation Q, and the final nK components correspond
to λ(Q)/wj for all allocations Q and all bidders j ∈ [n]. In total, the dimension of this parameter
space is at most 2n + 2n2 + K + nK = O(nK). Let v be a valuation vector. We claim that this
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parameter space can be partitioned using t = (n+ 1)K2 hyperplanes into regions where in any one
region P ′, there exists a vector k such that profitv(p) = k · p for all p ∈ P ′.
To this end, an allocation Q = (q1, . . . , qn) will be the allocation of the AMA so long as∑n
i=1wivi (qi)+λ(Q)−c(Q) ≥
∑n
i=1wivi (q
′
i)+λ (Q
′)−c(Q′) for all allocations Q′ = (q′1, . . . , q′n) 6=
Q. Since the number of different allocations is at most K, the allocation of the auction on v
is defined by at most K2 hyperplanes in Rd. Similarly, the allocations Q−1, . . . , Q−n are also
determined by at most K2 hyperplanes in Rd. Once these allocations are fixed, profit is a linear
function of this parameter space.
The proof for VVCAs follows the same argument except that we redefine the parameter space
to consist of vectors where the first n components correspond to the bidder weights wj for j ∈ [n],
the next n components correspond to 1/wj for j ∈ [n], the next 2
(
n
2
)
components correspond to
wi/wj for all i 6= j, the next K ′ = n2m components correspond to the bidder-specific bundle boosts
cj,q for every quantity vector q and bidder j ∈ [n], and the final nK ′ components correspond to
ck,q/wj for every quantity vector q and every pair of bidders j, k ∈ [n]. The dimension of this
parameter space is at most 2n+ 2n2 +K ′ + nK ′ ≤ 2K + nK ′ +K ′ + nK ′ = O(nK ′).
Finally, the proof for λ-auctions follows the same argument as the proof for AMAs except there
are zero bidder weights. Therefore, the parameter space consists of vectors with K components
corresponding to λ(Q) for every allocation Q.
Theorem 2.13. Let M and M′ be the classes of Q-boosted AMAs and λ-auctions. Then M is(
O (n (n+ |Q|)) , (n+ 1)2(m+1)
)
-delineable and M′ is
(
|Q|, (n+ 1) (|Q|+ 1)2
)
-delineable.
Proof. Let K = (n+ 1)m be the total number of allocations and let p be a parameter vector where
the first n components correspond to the bidder weights wj for j ∈ [n], the next n components
correspond to 1/wj for j ∈ [n], the next 2
(
n
2
)
components correspond to wi/wj for all i 6= j, the next
|Q| components correspond to λ(Q) for every allocation Q ∈ |Q|, and the final n|Q| components
correspond to λ(Q)/wj for all allocations Q ∈ Q and all bidders j ∈ [n]. In total, the dimension
of this parameter space is at most 2n + 2n2 + |Q| + n|Q| < (n + 2)(n + |Q|) ≤ 3n(n + |Q|). We
set d = 3n(n+ |Q|). Fix some valuation vector v. We claim that the allocation of any Q-boosted
AMA is determined by at most (n+ 1)K2 hyperplanes in Rd. To see why this is, the allocation will
be Qj =
(
qj1, . . . , q
j
n
)
where
∑
wivi
(
qji
)
+ λ
(
Qj
)− c(Qj) ≥∑wivi (qki )+ λ (Qk)− c(Qk) for all
allocations Qk =
(
qk1 , . . . , q
k
n
)
. This decision governing which of the K possible allocations will be
the AMA allocation is defined by the K2 hyperplanes, one per pair of distinct allocations Qj and
Qk.
By a similar argument, it is straightforward to see that K2 hyperplanes determine the allocation
of any AMA in this restricted space without any one bidder’s participation. This leads us to a total
of (n+ 1)K2 hyperplanes which partition the space of Q-boosted AMA parameters in a way such
that for any two parameter vectors in the same region, the auction allocations are the same, as are
the allocations without any one bidder’s participation. Once these allocations are fixed, profit is a
linear function in this parameter space.
The proof for λ-auctions is very similar to that for AMAs. However, we claim that the al-
location of any Q-boosted λ-auction is determined by at most (n + 1)(|Q| + 1)2 hyperplanes in
R|Q|. This is because without the bidder weights, the allocation of the Q-boosted λ-auction will
either be a boosted allocation or the VCG allocation if it is not boosted. Therefore, there are only
(|Q|+ 1)2 hyperplanes determining the allocation of the λ-auction, and the same number of hyper-
planes determine the allocation of the λ-auction in this restricted space without any one bidder’s
participation. Once these allocations are fixed, profit is linear function of the λ-terms.
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A.1 Additional lottery results
Lotteries for a unit-demand buyer. Recall that if the buyer is unit-demand, then for any
bundle q ∈ {0, 1}m, v1 (q) = maxi:q[i]≥1 v1 (ei). We assume that under a lottery
(
φ(j), p(j)
)
with
a unit-demand buyer, the buyer will only receive one item, and the probability that item is item
i is φ(j)[i]. Thus, we assume that
∑m
i=1 φ
(j)[i] ≤ 1. Since v1(ei) · φ(j)[i] is their value for item i
times the probability they get that item, their expected utility is
∑m
i=1 v1(ei) · φ(j)[i] − p(j), as in
the case with an additive buyer. Therefore, the following theorem follows by the exact same proof
as Theorem 2.5.
Theorem A.4. Let M′ be the class of functions defined in Section 2.1.1. Then M′ is(
` (m+ 1) , (`+ 1)2 +m`
)
-delineable.
Lotteries for multiple unit-demand or additive buyers. In order to generalize to multi-
buyer settings, we assume that there are n units of each item for sale and that each buyer will
receive at most one unit of each item. The buyers arrive simultaneously and each will buy the
lottery that maximizes her expected utility. Thus, the following is a corollary of Theorem 2.5.
Theorem A.5. Let M′ be the class of functions defined in Section 2.1.1. Then M′ is(
` (m+ 1) , n
(
(`+ 1)2 +m`
))
-delineable.
B Proofs from Section 3
Lemma B.1. Let X = X1× · · ·×Xd. Let F = {fp : p ∈ P} be a set of functions mapping X to R,
parameterized by a set P = P1×· · ·×Pd. Suppose for i ∈ [d], there exists a class Fi =
{
f
(i)
p : p ∈ Pi
}
of functions mapping Xi to R such that for any p = (p[1], . . . , p[d]) ∈ P, fp decomposes additively
as fp (v1, . . . , vd) =
∑d
i=1 f
(i)
p[i] (vi). Then
sup
v∈X ,p∈P
fp(v) =
d∑
i=1
sup
v∈Xi,p∈Pi
f (i)p (v) .
Proof. Recall that for any set A ⊆ R, s = supA if and only if:
1. For all  > 0, there exists a ∈ A such that a > s− , and
2. For all a ∈ A, a ≤ s.
Let ti = supv∈Xi,p∈Pi f
(i)
p (v) and let t =
∑d
i=1 ti. We will show that t = supv∈X ,p∈P fp(v).
First, we will show that condition (1) holds. In particular, we want to show that for all  > 0,
there exists v ∈ X and p ∈ P such that fp(v) > t − . Since ti = supv∈Xi,p∈Pi f
(i)
p (v), we know
that there exists vi ∈ Xi, pi ∈ P such that f (i)pi (vi) > ti − /d. Therefore, letting p = (p1, . . . , pd),
we know that fp (v1, . . . , vd) =
∑d
i=1 f
(i)
pi (vi) >
∑d
i=1 ti −  = t − . Since (v1, . . . , vd) ∈ X and
(p1, . . . , pd) ∈ P, we may conclude that condition (1) holds.
Next, we will show that condition (2) holds. In particular, we want to show that for all v ∈ X
and p ∈ P, fp(v) ≤ t. We know that f (i)p[i] (v[i]) ≤ ti, which means that fp(v) =
∑d
i=1 f
(i)
p[i] (v[i]) ≤∑d
i=1 ti = t. Therefore, condition (2) holds.
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Theorem 3.3. Let M and M′ be the sets of second-price auctions with anonymous and non-
anonymous reserves. Suppose the bidders are additive, D is item-independent, and the cost function
is additive. For any set S ∼ DN , R̂S (M) ≤ O
(
U
√
1/N
)
and R̂S (M′) ≤ O
(
U
√
n log n/N
)
.
Proof. We begin with anonymous second-price auctions, which are parameterized by a set P ⊂
Rm. Without loss of generality, we may write P = P1 × · · · × Pm, where Pi ⊂ R. Given a
valuation vector v and an item i, let v(i) ∈ Rn be all n buyers’ values for item i. Let profitp(v(i))
be the profit obtained by selling item i with a reserve price of p. Notice that for any p ∈ P,
profitp(v) =
∑m
i=1 profitp[i](v(i)). Let Xi be the support of the distribution over v(i) and let
Ui = supp∈Pi,v(i)∈Xi profitp(v(i)). Next, let X be the support of D. By definition, since U is
the maximum profit achievable via second price auctions over valuation vectors from X , we may
write U = supv∈X ,p∈P profitp(v). Since D is item-independent, we know that X = X1 × · · · × Xm.
Therefore, we may apply Lemma B.1, which tells us that U =
∑m
i=1 Ui. Finally, each class of
functions
{
profitp : p ∈ Pi
}
is (1, 2)-delineable, since for v(i) ∈ Xi, profitv(i)(p) is linear so long as
p is larger than the largest component of v(i), between the second largest and largest component
of v(i), or smaller than the second largest component of v(i). By Corollary 3.2, we may conclude
that for any set of samples S ∼ DN , R̂S(M) ≤ O
(
U
√
1/N
)
.
The bound on R̂S(M′) follows by almost the exact same logic, except for a few adjustments.
First of all, the class is defined by nm parameters coming from some set P ⊆ Rnm, since there
are n non-anonymous prices per item. Without loss of generality, we assume P = P1 × · · · × Pm,
where Pi ⊆ Rn is the set of non-anonymous prices for item i. Given a set of non-anonymous prices
p ∈ Rn for item i, let profitp(v(i)) be the profit of selling the item the bidders defined by v(i)
given the reserve prices p. Notice that profitv(i)(p) is linear so long as for each bidder j, p[j] is
either larger than their value for item i or smaller than their value. Thus, the set
{
profitp : p ∈ Pi
}
is (n, n)-delineable. Defining each Ui in the same way as before, Lemma B.1 guarantees that
U =
∑m
i=1 Ui. Therefore, by Corollary 3.2, we may conclude that for any set of samples S ∼ DN ,
R̂S(M′) ≤ O
(
U
√
n log n/N
)
.
Theorem 3.4. Let M and M′ be the sets of anonymous and non-anonymous item-pricing mech-
anisms, respectively. Suppose the bidders are additive, D is item-independent, and the cost func-
tion is additive. For any set of samples S ∼ DN , R̂S (M) ≤ O
(
U
√
1/N
)
and R̂S (M′) ≤
O
(
U
√
n log n/N
)
.
Proof. We begin with anonymous item-pricing mechanisms, which are parameterized by a set P ⊂
Rm. Without loss of generality, we may write P = P1×· · ·×Pm, where Pi ⊂ R. Given a valuation
vector v and an item i, let v(i) ∈ Rn be all n buyers’ values for item i. Let profitp(v(i)) be the profit
obtained by selling item i at a price of p, i.e., profitp(v(i)) = 1{||v(i)||∞≥p}(p − c(ei)). Notice that
for any p ∈ P, profitp(v) =
∑m
i=1 profitp[i](v(i)). Let Xi be the support of the distribution over v(i)
and let Ui = supp∈Pi,v(i)∈Xi profitp(v(i)). Next, let X be the support of D. By definition, since U is
the maximum profit achievable via item-pricing mechanisms over valuation vectors from X , we may
write U = supv∈X ,p∈P profitp(v). Since D is item-independent, we know that X = X1 × · · · × Xm.
Therefore, we may apply Lemma B.1, which tells us that U =
∑m
i=1 Ui. Finally, each class of
functions
{
profitp : p ∈ Pi
}
is (1, 1)-delineable, since for v(i) ∈ Xi, profitv(i)(p) is linear so long
as ||v(i)||∞ ≤ p or ||v(i)||∞ > p. By Corollary 3.2, we may conclude that for any set of samples
S ∼ DN , R̂S(M) ≤ O
(
U
√
1/N
)
.
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The bound on R̂S(M′) follows by almost the exact same logic, except for a few adjustments.
First of all, the class is defined by nm parameters coming from some set P ⊆ Rnm, since there
are n non-anonymous prices per item. Without loss of generality, we assume P = P1 × · · · × Pm,
where Pi ⊆ Rn is the set of non-anonymous prices for item i. Given a set of non-anonymous prices
p ∈ Rn for item i, let profitp(v(i)) be the profit of selling the item the bidders defined by v(i) given
the prices p. Notice that profitv(i)(p) is linear so long as for each bidder j, p(ej) is either larger
than their value for item i or smaller than their value. Thus, the set
{
profitp : p ∈ Pi
}
is (n, n)-
delineable. Defining each Ui in the same way as before, Lemma B.1 in Appendix B guarantees that
U =
∑m
i=1 Ui. Therefore, by Corollary 3.2, we may conclude that for any set of samples S ∼ DN ,
R̂S(M′) ≤ O
(
U
√
n log n/N
)
.
Theorem 3.5. Let M be the set of length-` item lottery menus. If the bidder is additive, D
is item-independent, and the cost function is additive, then for any set S ∼ DN , R̂S (M) ≤
O
(
U
√
` log `/N
)
.
Proof. For a given menu M = (M1, . . . ,Mm) of item lotteries, let profitMi(v) be the profit achieved
from menu Mi. Since the cost function is additive,
profitMi(v) = pi,v − Eq∼φi,v [c(q)] = pi,v − c(ei) · φi,v,
where (pi,v, φi,v) is the lottery in Mi that maximizes the buyer’s utility. Notice that profitM (v) =∑m
i=1 profitMi(v(ei)). Let Xi be the support of the distribution Di over v(ei) and let Ui =
supMi,v(ei)∈Xi profitMi(v(ei)). By definition, since U is the maximum profit achievable via item
menus over valuation vectors from X , we may write U = supv∈X ,M∈M profitM (v). Since D is a
product distribution, we know that X = X1 × · · · × Xm. Therefore, we may apply Lemma B.1,
which tells us that U =
∑m
i=1 Ui. Finally, for each i ∈ [n], the class of all single-item lotteries
Mi is (2`, `
2)-delineable, since for v(ei) ∈ Xi, the lottery the buyer chooses depends on the
(
`+1
2
)
hyperplanes φ
(j)
i v(ei) − p(j)i = φ(j
′)
i v(ei) − p(j
′)
i for j, j
′ ∈ {0, . . . , `}, and once the lottery is fixed,
profitMi(v) is a linear function.
Theorem 3.6. Let M and M′ be the classes of anonymous and non-anonymous item-pricing
mechanisms. Then Pdim (M) ≥ m and Pdim (M′) ≥ nm. The same holds if M and M′ are the
classes of second-price auctions with anonymous and non-anonymous reserves.
Proof. LetM be the class of item-pricing mechanisms with anonymous prices. We construct a set
S of m single-bidder, m-item valuation vectors that can be shattered by M. Let v(i) be valuation
vector where v
(i)
1 (ei) = 3 and v
(i)
1 (ej) = 0 for all j 6= i and let S =
{
v(1), . . . ,v(m)
}
. For any
T ⊆ [m], let MT be the mechanism defined such that the price of item i is 2 if i ∈ T and otherwise,
its price is 0. If i ∈ T , then profitMT (v(i)) = 2 and otherwise, profitMT (v(i)) = 0. Therefore, the
targets z(1) = · · · = z(m) = 1 witness the shattering of S by M. This example also proves that
the pseudo-dimension of the class of second-price auctions with anonymous reserve prices is also at
least m, since in the single-bidder case, this class is identical to M.
Next, letM′ be the class of item-pricing mechanisms with non-anonymous prices. We construct
a set S of nm n-bidder, m-item valuation vectors that can be shattered by M′. For i ∈ [m] and
j ∈ [n], let v(i,j) be valuation vector where v(i,j)j (ei) = 3 and v(i,j)j′ (ei′) = 0 for all (i′, j′) 6= (i, j). Let
S = {v(i,j)}
i∈[m],j∈[n]. For any T ⊆ [m]× [n], let MT be the mechanism defined such that the price
of item i for bidder j is 2 if (i, j) ∈ T and otherwise, it is 0. If (i, j) ∈ T , then profitMT (v(i,j)) = 2
and otherwise, profitMT (v
(i,j)) = 0. Therefore, the targets z(i,j) = 1 for all i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n] witness
33
the shattering of S by M. This example with the prices as reserve prices also proves that the
pseudo-dimension of the class of second-price auctions with non-anonymous reserve prices is at
least nm.
Theorem 3.7. For a valuation vector v, let MPM (v) be the maximum profit achievable by mech-
anisms in M. Suppose that with probability at least 1 − b, MPM (v) ≤ a. With probability 1 − δ
over the draw of a sample S ∼ DN ,
R̂S (M) = O

√√√√Pdim (M)
N
(
a2 + U2
(
b+
√
1
N3
log
1
δ
)) .
Proof. For S = {v(1), . . . ,v(N)}, let Xi be a random variable where Xi = 0 if MPM (v(i)) ≤ a and
Xi = 1 if MPM
(
v(i)
)
> a. By a Chernoff bound, we know that
Pr
[
N∑
i=1
Xi ≥ bN +
√
1
2N
log
2
δ
]
≤ δ.
Assume that it is indeed the case that∣∣∣{v(i) : MPM (v(i)) > a}∣∣∣ ≤ bN +√ 1
2N
log
2
δ
.
We define the sets B =
{
i : MPM
(
v(i)
)
> a
}
and L =
{
i : MPM
(
v(i)
) ≤ a} . We may write
NR̂S(M) = Eσ
[
sup
M∈M
N∑
i=1
σiprofitM
(
v(i)
)]
≤ Eσ
[
sup
M∈M
∑
i∈L
σiprofitM
(
v(i)
)
+ sup
M∈M
∑
i∈B
σiprofitM
(
v(i)
)]
= Eσ
[
sup
M∈M
∑
i∈L
σiprofitM
(
v(i)
)]
+ Eσ
[
sup
M∈M
∑
i∈B
σiprofitM
(
v(i)
)]
= |L|R̂L(M) + |B|R̂B(M)
= |L| ·O
(
a
√
Pdim(M)
|L|
)
+ |B| ·O
(
U
√
Pdim(M)
|B|
)
= O
(√
a2Pdim(M)|L|
)
+O
(√
U2Pdim(M)|B|
)
= O
(√
a2Pdim(M)|L|+ U2Pdim(M)|B|
)
≤ O

√√√√a2Pdim(M)N + U2Pdim(M)(bN +√ 1
N
log
1
δ
)
= O

√√√√N (a2Pdim(M) + U2Pdim(M)(b+√ 1
N3
log
1
δ
)) .
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Therefore,
R̂S(M) = O

√√√√Pdim(M)
N
(
a2 + U2
(
b+
√
1
N3
log
1
δ
)) .
Theorem B.2. Let M be the class of length-` lottery menus under an additive or unit-demand
bidder. Suppose the cost function is additive. Then MPM(v) =
∑m
i=1 v(ei)1 {v(ei) ≥ c(ei)} .
Proof. Since we are only maximizing profit over a single buyer’s valuation vector v, we only need to
bound the maximum revenue achievable via a single lottery. If the buyer chooses to buy a lottery
(p,φ), the profit will be p −∑mi=1 c(ei) · φ[i]. So long as p ≤ v · φ, the buyer will buy the lottery,
so we can maximize profit by setting p = v ·φ. Therefore, profit is ∑mi=1 (v(ei)− c(ei))φ[i], which
is maximized with φ[i] = 1 whenever v(ei) ≥ c(ei) and φ[i] = 0 otherwise.
Theorem B.3. Let M be the class of item-pricing mechanisms with non-anonymous prices under
additive buyers and let M′ be the class of second-price item auctions with non-anonymous prices
under additive buyers. Suppose the cost function is additive. Then
MPM(v) =
m∑
i=1
max
j∈[n]
{vj(ei)}1
{
max
j∈[n]
{vj(ei)} ≥ c(ei)
}
.
Proof. Suppose the buyers are additive. Under a second-price item auction or an item-pricing
mechanism, we can always obtain revenue that equals
∑m
i=1 maxj∈[n]{vj(ei)} by charging a price
of maxj∈[n]{vj(ei)} for each item i. However, if the cost to produce item i is greater than
maxj∈[n]{vj(ei)}, the seller should not sell it. The bound thus follows.
C Proofs from Section 4
Theorem 4.1. Let M be the class of non-anonymous item-pricing mechanisms over additive bid-
ders and let w : [n] → R be a weight function such that ∑ni=1w (i) ≤ 1. Then for any δ ∈ (0, 1),
with probability at least 1− δ over the draw S ∼ DN , for any k ∈ [n] and any mechanism M ∈Mk,
|profitS (M)− profitD (M)| = O
(
U
√
km log (nm)
N
+ U
√
1
N
log
1
δ · w (k)
)
.
Proof. This theorem follows from the fact that Mk is (km, nm)-delineable. Every mechanism in
Mk is defined by km parameters, one price per item per price group, and for every buyer j, the
goods they are willing to buy are defined by the m hyperplanes vj(ei) = pj(ei) for every item i.
Therefore, the theorem follows from Theorems 2.1 and 2.2, and by multiplying δ with w(k).
Two-part tariffs. Let M be the class of anonymous two-part tariff menus, by which we mean
the union of all length-` menus of two-part tariffs with anonymous prices. Similarly, letM′ be the
class of non-anonymous two-part tariff menus. For a given menu M of two-part tariffs, let `M be
the length of its menu.
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Theorem C.1. Let w : N → [0, 1] be a weight function such that ∑w(i) ≤ 1. Then for any
δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1− δ over the draw of a set of samples of size N from D, for any
mechanism M ∈M, the difference between the average profit of M over the set of samples and the
expected profit of M over D is
O
(
U
√
`M log(nκ`M )
N
+ U
√
1
N
log
1
δ · w(`M )
)
.
Also, with probability at least 1 − δ over the draw of a set of samples of size N from D, for any
mechanism M ∈M′, the difference between the average profit of M over the set of samples and the
expected profit of M over D is at most
O
(
U
√
n`M log(nκ`M )
N
+ U
√
1
N
log
1
δ · w(`M )
)
.
Q-boosted λ-auctions. For the next theorem, given a λ-auction M , let QM be the set of all
allocations Q such that λ(Q) > 0.
Theorem C.2. LetM be the class of λ-auctions and let w be a weight function which maps sets of
allocations Q to [0, 1] such that ∑w(Q) ≤ 1. Then for any δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1− δ
over the draw of a set of samples of size N from D, for any mechanism M ∈ M, the difference
between the average profit of M over the set of samples and the expected profit of M over D is at
most
O
(
U
√
|QM | log(n|QM |)
N
+ U
√
1
N
log
1
δ · w(QM )
)
.
Menu lotteries. LetM be the class of lottery menus, by which we mean the union of all length-`
lottery menus. For a given lottery menu M , let `M be the length of its menu.
Theorem C.3. Let w : N → [0, 1] be a weight function such that ∑w(i) ≤ 1. Then for any
δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1− δ over the draw of a set of samples of size N from D, for any
mechanism M ∈M, the difference between the average profit of M over the set of samples and the
expected profit of M over D is
O
(
U
√
`M log(n`M )
N
+ U
√
1
N
log
1
δ · w(`M )
)
.
D Proofs from Section 5
Example D.1 (Item-pricing mechanisms (Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2016)). Let M be the
class of anonymous item-pricing mechanisms over a single additive bidder and let p = (p1, . . . , pm)
be a vector of prices. In this case, we can define f
(1)
p : X → {0, 1}m where the ith component of
f
(1)
p (v) is 1 if and only if the buyer buys item i. Define ψ(v,α) = (v(α),−α) and definewp = (1,p).
Then the α that maximizes 〈wp, ψ(v,α)〉 is the α that maximizes the buyer’s utility, i.e., f (1)p (v),
as desired. Finally, we define f
(2)
p (v,α) = 〈α,p〉, and we have that profitp(v) = f (2)p
(
v, f
(1)
p (v)
)
,
as desired.
36
Theorem 5.1. Suppose M is mechanism class that is (d, t1, t2)-divisible with t1, t2 ≥ 1 and
a-dimensionally linearly separable over Y. Let ω = min
{
|Y|a, d (at1)d
}
. Then Pdim (M) =
O ((d+ a) log (d+ a) + d log t2 + logω).
Proof. To prove this theorem, we will use the following standard notation. For a class F of real-
valued functions mapping X to R, let S = {v(1), . . . ,v(N)} be a subset of X . We define
ΠF (S) = max
z(1),...,z(N)∈R
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣


1{f(v(1))≥z(1)}
...
1{f(v(N))≥z(N)}
 : f ∈ F

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
The pseudo-dimension of F is the size of the largest set S such that ΠF (S) = 2|S|. We also use the
notation f(S) to denote the vector (f(v(1)), . . . , f(v(N))). Morgenstern and Roughgarden (2016)
proved the following lemma.
Lemma D.1 (Morgenstern and Roughgarden (2016)). Suppose M is (F (1),F (2))-decomposable
and a-dimensionally linearly separable. Let S = {v(1), . . . ,v(N)} be a subset of X . Then
ΠM(S) ≤
∣∣∣{(S ′, f (1)p (S ′)) : S ′ ⊆ S, |S ′| = a,p ∈ P}∣∣∣
· max
α(1),...,α(N)∈Y
{
ΠF(2)
({(
v(1),α(1)
)
, . . . ,
(
v(N),α(N)
)})}
.
Suppose the pseudo-dimension ofM is N . By definition, there exists a set S = {v(1), . . . ,v(N)}
that is shattered by M. By Lemmas D.1 and D.2, this means that
2N = ΠM(S) ≤ Naω max
α(1),...,α(N)∈Y
{
ΠF(2)
({(
v(1),α(1)
)
, . . . ,
(
v(N),α(N)
)})}
.
To prove this theorem, we will show that
max
α(1),...,α(N)∈Y
{
ΠF(2)
({(
v(1),α(1)
)
, . . . ,
(
v(N),α(N)
)})}
< d2
(
N2t2
)d
, (1)
which means that 2N < N2d+ad2td2ω, and thus N = O ((d+ a) log(d+ a) + d log t2 + logω).
To this end, let α(1), . . . ,α(N) be N arbitrary elements of Y and let z(1), . . . , z(N) be N arbitrary
elements of R. Since M is (d, t1, t2)-divisible, we know that for each i ∈ [N ], there is a set H(i)2 of
t2 hyperplanes such that for any connected component P ′ of P \H(i)2 , f (2)v(i),α(i) (p) is linear over all
p ∈ P ′. We now consider the overlay of all N partitions P\H(1)2 , . . . ,P\H(N)2 . Formally, this overlay
is made up of the sets P1, . . . ,Pτ , which are the connected components of P\
(⋃N
i=1H(i)2
)
. For each
set Pj and each i ∈ [N ], Pj is completely contained in a single connected component of P \ H(i)2 ,
which means that f
(2)
v(i),α(i)
(p) is linear over Pj . Since
∣∣∣H(i)2 ∣∣∣ ≤ t2 for all i ∈ [N ], τ < d(Nt2)d (Buck,
1943).
Now, consider a single connected component Pj of P \
(⋃N
i=1H(i)2
)
. For any sample v(i) ∈ S, we
know that f
(2)
v(i),α(i)
(p) is linear over Pj . Let a(i)j ∈ Rd and b(i)j ∈ R be the weight vector and offset
such that f
(2)
v(i),α(i)
(p) = a
(i)
j ·p+b(i)j for all p ∈ Pj . We know that there is a hyperplane a(i)j ·p+b(i)j =
z(i) where on one side of the hyperplane, f
(2)
v(i),α(i)
(p) ≤ z(i) and on the other side, f (2)
v(i),α(i)
(p) > z(i).
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Let HPj be all N hyperplanes for all N samples, i.e., HPj =
{
a
(i)
j · p+ b(i)j = z(i) : i ∈ [N ]
}
. Notice
that in any connected component P ′ of Pj \ HPj , for all i ∈ [N ], f (2)v(i),α(i) (p) is either greater than
z(i) or less than z(i) (but not both) for all p ∈ P ′.
In total, the number of connected components of Pj \HPj is smaller than dNd. The same holds
for every partition Pj . Thus, the total number of regions where for all i ∈ [N ], f (2)v(i),α(i) (p) is either
greater than z(i) or less than z(i) (but not both) is smaller than dNd · d(Nt2)d. In other words,∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣


1
(
f
(2)
p
(
v(1),α(1)
) ≥ z(1))
...
1
(
f
(2)
p
(
v(N),α(N)
) ≥ z(N))
 : p ∈ P

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ dN
d · d(Nt2)d.
Since we chose α(1), . . . ,α(N) and z(1), . . . , z(N) arbitrarily, we may conclude that Inequality (1)
holds.
Lemma D.2. Suppose M is a-dimensionally linearly separable over Y and (d, t1, t2)-divisible.
Then for any set S ⊆ X of size N ,∣∣∣{(S ′, f (1)p (S ′)) : S ′ ⊆ S, |S ′| = a,p ∈ P}∣∣∣ ≤ Na min{|Y|a, d(at1)d} .
Proof. To begin with, there are of course at most Na ways to choose a set S ′ ⊆ S of size a. How
many ways are there to label a fixed set S ′ = {v(i1), . . . ,v(ia)} of size a using functions from F (1)?
An easy upper bound is |Y|a. Alternatively, we can use the structure ofM to prove that there are
d(at1)
d ways to label S ′. Since M is (d, t1, t2)-divisible, we know that for any v(ij) ∈ S ′, there is
a set H(ij)1 of t1 hyperplanes such that for any connected component P ′ of P \ H(ij)1 , f (1)v(ij)(p) is
constant over all p ∈ P ′. We now consider the overlay of all a partitions P \H(ij)1 for all v(ij) ∈ S ′.
Formally, this overlay is made up of the sets P1, . . . ,Pτ , which are the connected components of
P \
(⋃
v(ij)∈S′ H
(ij)
1
)
. For each set Pt and each v(ij) ∈ S ′, Pt is completely contained in a single
connected component of P \H(ij)1 , which means that f (1)v(ij) (p) is constant over Pt. This means that
the number of ways to label S ′ is at most τ . Since
∣∣∣H(ij)1 ∣∣∣ ≤ t1 for all v(ij) ∈ S ′, τ < d(at1)d
(Buck, 1943). Therefore,
∣∣∣{(S ′, f (1)p (S ′)) : S ′ ⊆ S, |S ′| = a,p ∈ P}∣∣∣ ≤ Na min{|Y|a, d(att)d}, so
the lemma statement holds.
Theorem D.3. Let M and M′ be the classes of anonymous and non-anonymous second price
item auctions. Then M is (m,m,m)-divisible and M′ is (nm,m,m)-divisible. Also, M and M′
are (m + 1)- and (nm + 1)-dimensionally linearly separable over {0, 1}m and [n]m. Therefore,
Pdim(M) = O(m logm) and Pdim(M′) = O(nm log(nm)).
Proof. We begin with anonymous reserves. For a given valuation vector v, let ji be the highest
bidder for item i and let j′i be the second highest bidder. Let f
(1)
p : X → {0, 1}m be defined so that
the ith component is 1 if and only if item i is sold. There are t1 = m hyperplanes splitting Rm into
regions where f
(1)
v (p) is constant: the i
th component of f
(1)
v (p) is 1 if and only if vji(ei) ≥ p(ei).
Next, we can write f
(2)
p (v,α) =
∑
i:α[i]=1 max
{
vj′i(ei), p(ei)
}
− c(α), which is linear so long as
either vj′i(ei) < p(ei) or vj′i(ei) ≥ p(ei) for all i ∈ [m]. Therefore, there are t2 = m hyperplanes H2
such that for any connected component P ′ of P \ H2, f (2)v,α(p) is linear over all p ∈ P ′.
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Under non-anonymous reserve prices, let f
(1)
p : X → {0, 1}nm be defined so that for every bidder
j and every item i, there is a component of f
(1)
p (v) that is 1 if and only if bidder j receives item i.
There are t1 = m hyperplanes splitting Rnm into regions where f
(1)
v (p) is constant: for every item
i, the component corresponding to bidder ji is 1 if and only if vji(ei) ≥ pj(ei). Next, we can write
f
(2)
p (v,α) =
∑
i:α[i]=1 max
{
vj′i(ei), pji(ei)
}
−c(α), which is linear so long as either vj′i(ei) < pji(ei)
or vj′i(ei) ≥ pji(ei) for all i ∈ [m]. Therefore, there are t2 = m hyperplanes H2 such that for any
connected component P ′ of P \ H2, f (2)v,α(p) is linear over all p ∈ P ′.
Morgenstern and Roughgarden (2016) proved that M and M′ are (m + 1)- and (nm + 1)-
dimensionally linearly separable over {0, 1}m and [n]m, respectively.
Theorem D.4. Let M and M′ be the classes of item-pricing mechanisms with anonymous prices
and non-anonymous prices, respectively. If the buyers are additive, then M is (m,m, 1)-divisible
and M′ is (nm, nm, 1)-divisible. Also, M and M′ are (m + 1)- and (nm + 1)-dimensionally
linearly separable over {0, 1}m and [n]m. Therefore, Pdim(M) = O(m logm) and Pdim(M′) =
O(nm log(nm)).
Proof. We begin with anonymous reserves. For a given valuation vector v, let ji be the buyer with
the highest valuation for item i. Let f
(1)
p : X → {0, 1}m be defined so that the ith component is 1
if and only if item i is sold. There are t1 = m hyperplanes splitting Rm into regions where f
(1)
v (p)
is constant: the ith component of f
(1)
v (p) is 1 if and only if vji(ei) ≥ p(ei). Next, we can write
f
(2)
p (v,α) = α · p, which is always linear, so we may set t2 = 1.
Under non-anonymous reserve prices, let f
(1)
p : X → {0, 1}nm be defined so that for every bidder
j and every item i, there is a component of f
(1)
p (v) that is 1 if and only if bidder j receives item i.
There are t1 = nm hyperplanes splitting Rnm into regions where f
(1)
v (p) is constant: vj(ei) = pj(ei)
for all i and all j. Next, we can write f
(2)
p (v,α) = α · p, which is always linear, so we may set
t2 = 1.
Morgenstern and Roughgarden (2016) proved that M and M′ are (m + 1)- and (nm + 1)-
dimensionally linearly separable over {0, 1}m and [n]m, respectively.
Theorem 5.2. Let M and M′ be the classes of item-pricing mechanisms with anonymous prices
and non-anonymous prices. If the buyers are unit-demand, then M is (m,nm2, 1)-divisible and
M′ is (nm, nm2, 1)-divisible. Also, M and M′ are (m+ 1)- and (nm+ 1)-dimensionally lin-
early separable over {0, 1}m and [n]m. Therefore, Pdim (M) = O (min{m2,m log (nm)}) and
Pdim (M′) = O (nm log(nm)).
Proof. We begin with anonymous reserves. Let f
(1)
p : X → {0, 1}m be defined so that the ith
component is 1 if and only if item i is sold. For each bidder j, there are
(
m
2
)
hyperplanes defining
their preference ordering on the items: vj(ei) − p(ei) = vj(ek) − p(ek) for all i 6= k. This gives a
total of at most t1 = nm
2 hyperplanes splitting Rm into regions where f (1)v (p) is constant. Next,
we can write f
(2)
p (v,α) = α · p, which is always linear, so we may set t2 = 1.
Under non-anonymous reserve prices, let f
(1)
p : X → {0, 1}nm be defined so that for every bidder
j and every item i, there is a component of f
(1)
p (v) that is 1 if and only if bidder j receives item
i. As with anonymous prices, there are t1 = nm
2 hyperplanes splitting Rnm into regions where
f
(1)
v (p) is constant. Next, we can write f
(2)
p (v,α) = α · p, which is always linear, so we may set
t2 = 1.
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Morgenstern and Roughgarden (2016) proved that M and M′ are (m + 1)- and (nm + 1)-
dimensionally linearly separable over {0, 1}m and [n]m, respectively.
Theorem 5.3. Let M and M′ be the classes of item-pricing mechanisms with anonymous prices
and non-anonymous prices, respectively. If the buyers have general values, thenM is (m,n22m, 1)-
divisible and M′ is (nm, n22m, 1)-divisible. Also, M is (m+ 1)-dimensionally linearly separable
over {0, 1}m and M′ is (nm+ 1)-dimensionally linearly separable over [n]m. Thus, Pdim (M) =
O
(
m2
)
and Pdim (M′) = O (nm (m+ log n)).
Proof. We begin with anonymous reserves. Let f
(1)
p : X → {0, 1}m be defined so that the ith
component is 1 if and only if item i is sold. For each bidder j, there are
(
2m
2
)
hyperplanes defining
their preference ordering on the bundles: vj(q) −
∑
i:q[i]=1 p(ei) = vj(q
′) −∑i:q′[i]=1 p(ei) for all
q, q′ ∈ {0, 1}m. This gives a total of at most t1 = n22m hyperplanes splitting Rm into regions where
f
(1)
v (p) is constant. Next, we can write f
(2)
p (v,α) = α · p, which is always linear, so we may set
t2 = 1.
Under non-anonymous reserve prices, let f
(1)
p : X → {0, 1}nm be defined so that for every bidder
j and every item i, there is a component of f
(1)
p (v) that is 1 if and only if bidder j receives item
i. As with anonymous prices, there are t1 = n2
2m hyperplanes splitting Rnm into regions where
f
(1)
v (p) is constant. Next, we can write f
(2)
p (v,α) = α · p, which is always linear, so we may set
t2 = 1.
Morgenstern and Roughgarden (2016) proved that M and M′ are (m + 1)- and (nm + 1)-
dimensionally linearly separable over {0, 1}m and [n]m, respectively.
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